Archive for ‘Centre for Strategic and International Studies’

27/12/2019

China’s ‘great friendship’ with Micronesia grows warmer, leaving US with strategic headache in Pacific

  • As US financial support expires in 2023, Beijing could ‘loosen the screws’ on regional alliance with lucrative development deals
  • Independence vote in Micronesia’s Chuuk state in March could raise the stakes, potentially allowing China access to strategically vital waters
President of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo shakes hands with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Photo: Xinhua
President of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo shakes hands with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Photo: Xinhua
In China earlier this month, David Panuelo, the president of the Federated States of Micronesia, climbed the Badaling section of the Great Wall. And, according to Huang Zheng, Beijing’s ambassador to the Pacific nation, the countries’ “great friendship rose to even greater heights” during Panuelo’s visit.
Chinese investment in Micronesia reached similarly lofty levels in conjunction with Panuelo’s trip, which marked three decades of diplomatic ties and included meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. Beijing has committed US$72 million in economic development deals, almost as much as its total investment of the previous three decades.
Micronesia is one of three Pacific nations with agreements with Washington, known as the Compact of Free Association (COFA), which allows their citizens to live and work in the US. In exchange, Micronesia, neighbouring Palau and the Marshall Islands grant the US exclusive military and defence access to their territorial waters – more than 2 million square miles of the Pacific that have been an essential element of Washington’s power projection in the region since World War II.
However, analysts warn Micronesia’s “great friendship” and tighter economic ties with Beijing could undermine this long-standing defence relationship with the US.
Much of China’s funding has been directed to Micronesia’s Chuuk state, which will in March vote in an independence referendum.
Although Chuuk is home to fewer than 50,000 people, its waters include one of the region’s deepest and most strategically appealing lagoons, creating extra incentive for Beijing and potential concern for Washington as the two countries

vie for influence in the Pacific.

How China ‘loosens the screws’

With a population of just 113,000 people, Micronesia relies on remittances sent home by citizens working in the US as well as the financial support from Washington under COFA. That assistance is scheduled to expire in 2023, creating uncertainty about the future of the relationship and making Chinese investment even more influential.

“Panuelo’s visit to China is a perfect example of how [the Chinese side] just needs to do a little to get a lot,” said Derek Grossman, senior analyst at Rand Corporation, a Washington think tank. “US$100 million is not very much for them and they can essentially loosen the screws [on COFA] with that.”

Micronesian President David Panuelo (second on left) and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (right) during their talks in Beijing. Photo: EPA-EFE
Micronesian President David Panuelo (second on left) and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (right) during their talks in Beijing. Photo: EPA-EFE
The value of Micronesia’s bilateral trade with China has increased by nearly 30 per cent annually for the past five years, according to Micronesia’s Foreign Ministry. In 2017, the island nation signed onto President Xi’s signature Belt and Road Initiative which aims to build a vast network of strategic investment, trade routes and infrastructure projects across more than 150 countries.
US-China tech war’s new battleground: undersea internet cables14 Dec 2019

In recent years Chinese funding in Micronesia has built office and residential complexes for government officials, a showpiece new convention centre in the capital city Palikir, transport infrastructure and student exchanges, according to a recent report by Rand.

Jian Zhang, associate professor at UNSW Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy, said Beijing’s investment reflected a decision to cultivate broader, deeper ties.

Micronesian President David Panuelo during his meeting with Chinese officials in Beijing. Photo: EPA-EFE
Micronesian President David Panuelo during his meeting with Chinese officials in Beijing. Photo: EPA-EFE
“China’s interest in building the relationship with Micronesia is not just about its diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan or economic interests,” he said. “It has elevated the relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership which encompasses all areas.”

During his recent visit, Panuelo described China as Micronesia’s top economic partner and the US as its top security partner. Pompeo’s visit to Micronesia highlights US anxiety about rising Chinese influence in Pacific 5 Aug 2019

Gerard Finin, professor of regional planning at Cornell University, who previously worked with the US Department of State in the Pacific, said: “China’s leadership consistently accords large ocean states the full protocol that is expected when a head of state visits.

“In contrast, Washington has only had a limited number of meetings and never hosted an official state visit to Washington for the leader of a Pacific Island nation,” said Finin.

US President Donald Trump in May hosted the leaders of Micronesia, Palau and the Marshall Islands together at the White House. When Mike Pompeo visited Micronesia
in August, he became the only sitting US secretary of state to have done so.
Pompeo said negotiations to update COFA had begun but no details have been made public. Micronesia has assembled a team to conduct the negotiations but the US has not, the Honolulu Civil Beat website reported.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Micronesia in August. Photo: AFP
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Micronesia in August. Photo: AFP

Breakaway vote could raise the stakes

Panuelo’s team met Micronesian students studying in China and representatives of state-owned China Railway Construction Corporation, which will build the roads in Chuuk, funded in part by US$50 million from Beijing. Construction of the Chuuk government complex was also funded by Beijing and the state’s governor joined Panuelo for his visit.

Should Chuuk vote to separate from Micronesia in March, it could also mean breaking from COFA, jeopardising the US work privileges of thousands of Chuukese and opening the state’s waters to other partners, particularly China.

Chuuk is home to one of the deepest lagoons in the Pacific, a geographic rarity of particular value in strategic military operations and submarine navigation.

US Coast Guard looks to bolster Pacific allegiances as Chinese clout grows
22 Oct 2019

Zhang said Beijing would explore any opportunity to build a port with potential military capability.

“China has a long-term need to gain a strategic foothold in the region,” Zhang said. “That is a key part of the Belt and Road Initiative. At the general level it’s an economic initiative but an important aspect of the maritime Silk Road is to develop a network of strategically located port facilities.”

Sabino Asor, chair of the public education committee for the Chuuk Political Status Commission, told Civil Beat seceding from Micronesia would be the best option for Chuuk’s future.

“There is no encouraging prospect if Chuuk remains within the Federation,” he said.

However, Patrick Buchan, at Washington think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said Chuuk’s dependence on remittances from the US made breaking from COFA unlikely.

China courts Pacific island states in pursuit of ‘foothold’ as US risks losing influence

8 Aug 2019

In the meantime, uncertainty over COFA negotiations persists, although there is a chance it will be renewed with few changes.

“There is circulation with people easily coming and going that provides a level of understanding and friendship that does not exist between too many other countries,” Finin said.

However, China’s most attractive feature may be its willingness to at least discuss the most pressing concern of Pacific Island nations: climate change.

“When the Trump administration talks about how it doesn’t believe in climate change, or can’t even say the words – that is really offensive for Pacific nations,” Grossman said. “China knows that, and is taking full advantage of it.”

Source: SCMP

19/06/2019

Xi Jinping and Donald Trump to broaden agenda beyond US-China trade war for meeting at G20 summit in Osaka

  • Osaka summit intended to pull bilateral ties away from brinkmanship that has dragged relations to lowest point in decades
  • Trade war just one of the items on the agenda, analysts say, along with principles of relationship, North Korea, and Huawei
The last time the US President Donald Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping met was in Buenos Aires in December. Analysts are confident that their meeting at the G20 Summit in Osaka this month can yield a freeze in the escalation of the trade war. Photo: Reuters
The last time the US President Donald Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping met was in Buenos Aires in December. Analysts are confident that their meeting at the G20 Summit in Osaka this month can yield a freeze in the escalation of the trade war. Photo: Reuters
When Chinese President Xi Jinping meets his US counterpart Donald Trump in Japan at the end of the month they are expected to discuss a broad range of issues, including the trade war, in an effort to stop the relationship from tilting towards sustained confrontation, analysts said.
Neither side has provided an agenda for the meeting on the sidelines of the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, despite confirmation coming from both sides that it was to take place, after weeks of speculation.
A summary of Tuesday’s phone conversation between Xi and Trump published by Xinhua, however, implied that the leaders would cover more strategic issues, leaving the nuts and bolts of a trade deal to their negotiating teams. Meanwhile, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang said at a regular press conference on Wednesday that the two leaders would discuss the overall direction of bilateral relations, but he did not elaborate further.
Both China and the United States have confirmed that their leaders will meet in Osaka at the end of June, at a time when US-China relations have nosedived. Photo: AP
Both China and the United States have confirmed that their leaders will meet in Osaka at the end of June, at a time when US-China relations have nosedived. Photo: AP
Wei Jianguo

, a former vice-minister at China’s Ministry of Commerce, predicted that Beijing would use the meeting to make clear a few principles regarding the bilateral relationship.

“It’s inevitable [for China and the US] to have problems in certain fields, but both sides should resolve the problems through dialogue on an equal footing rather than opting for a trade war, a tech war, or a financial war,” said Wei, now a vice-chair at the state-backed China Centre for International Economic Exchanges, a think tank.
He added that China would try to convince the US that it had no intention of challenging its global hegemony, but that China’s own “core interests”, including its sovereignty, territorial rights and room to develop, “must be respected”.

A government official in Beijing, who declined to be identified, said China was pinning its hopes on the leaders’ summit to ease general tensions between Beijing and Washington, even though the chances of the leaders reaching any concrete agreements in Osaka was small.

“Without a leaders’ summit, it would be difficult to push ahead the work [to reach agreements] at the ministerial or lower levels,” the source said.

Wei Jianguo, a former vice-minister at China’s Ministry of Commerce, predicted that Beijing would use the meeting to make clear a few principles regarding the bilateral relationship. Photo: Handout
Wei Jianguo, a former vice-minister at China’s Ministry of Commerce, predicted that Beijing would use the meeting to make clear a few principles regarding the bilateral relationship. Photo: Handout

The last summit between Trump and Xi in Buenos Aires in December resulted in a tariff truce and negotiations that continued until early-May. But the talks failed to achieve a deal to end the conflict, resulting in the US more than doubling tariffs on US$200 billion of Chinese imports and threatening tariffs on almost all remaining Chinese imports, valued at US$300 billion by the US government.

Tuesday’s telephone call, in which 

Xi told Trump

he was willing to exchange views with Trump on “the fundamental issues” affecting China-US relations, came at a low point in recent China-US relations.

The tariff increase followed the collapse of trade talks in early-May, while hostile rhetoric has spread into the political and military spheres. The US labelled China a “strategic competitor” and accused Beijing of conducting sustained espionage to impede US’s national security, while China blamed the US for trying to thwart China’s development by targeting Huawei and infringing on China’s sovereignty over Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Zhou Rong, a senior fellow from the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at the Renmin University of China, said the two leaders have a long list of issues to talk about this time in addition to trade, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, as well as the treatment of Chinese companies in the US. China can offer to help on some issues but “the US should not force China to swallow bitter fruit it cannot digest”, Zhou said.
Ni Feng, a specialist in Sino-US relations at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said they would discuss the “overall direction” of their bilateral relationship, including where the two nations could engage in “competition and cooperation”.
He added that North Korea may be on the agenda because “China and the US share the same goal of the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.” 
Xi is set to start

 a two-day state visit to Pyongyang on Thursday.

Another source in the Chinese government, who wished to remain anonymous, said Xi was very likely to bring up the US’ blacklisting of Huawei, China’s leading technology firm. Washington has effectively banned American companies from providing key components to the Shenzhen-based company.
Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer and the daughter of founder Ren Zhengfei, is currently on bail in Canada awaiting extradition to the US to face charges that both she and Huawei violated US sanctions on Iran.
During Tuesday’s call, Xi told Trump that China “hopes the US side can treat Chinese businesses fairly”, Xinhua reported.
China's President Xi Jinping waits for the start of the G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Friday, Nov. 30, 2018. Photo: AP
China’s President Xi Jinping waits for the start of the G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Friday, Nov. 30, 2018. Photo: AP

At the same time, Trump and Xi agreed that the two countries’ trade negotiators would start to talk again before the meeting in Japan, raising prospects for a second truce in the trade war, or even a deal to end the conflict.

Matthew Goodman, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, wrote in a note that a Trump-Xi deal on trade-in Osaka “is certainly possible”.

The most likely outcome is similar to the one reached in Buenos Aires in December last year, when Trump and Xi “agreed to a temporary truce while trade negotiators work to hammer out a deal”, Goodman wrote. “This would postpone the worst effects of the current escalation but is unlikely to solve the deepening and dangerous rift in US-China relations”.

The South China Morning Post previously reported that the Osaka summit meeting, which is likely to take place on Saturday June 29, could also be a sit-down dinner between Trump, Xi and their top economic and security aides, as occurred in Buenos Aires. Trump tweeted Tuesday night that he would have an “extended” meeting with Xi in Japan.

Source: SCMP

17/06/2019

Oil tanker attacks: did Iran’s ties with China just go up in smoke?

  • Washington has blamed Tehran for an attack on two oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, putting pressure on Iran’s allies like China
  • Beijing usually backs its trade partner – but experts say the trade war with the US and problems with Huawei may have changed the equation
A tanker burns in the Gulf of Oman after a mystery attack that the United States has blamed on Iran. Photo: AFP
A tanker burns in the Gulf of Oman after a mystery attack that the United States has blamed on Iran. Photo: AFP
When 
Shinzo Abe

headed to Tehran this week for the first visit by a sitting Japanese prime minister in four decades, some in the diplomatic world imagined he could be the man to bring

Iran

back to the negotiating table with the

United States

.

Those hopes were torpedoed on Thursday when, on the same day Abe was meeting Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, explosions ripped through two oil tankers, one Japanese and one Norwegian, near the Strait of Hormuz, a strategically significant shipping lane.
The attack immediately overshadowed an earlier success for Abe, who had met President Hassan Rowhani a day before and was assured Iran would stick to the terms of a 2015 agreement limiting its nuclear activities.
Washington accused Iran of being behind the attack on the tankers, releasing a video on Friday that it said showed Iran’s revolutionary guard removing an unexploded mine from one of the ships, and warning that it would “defend its interests”.
Iranian President Hassan Rowhani and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe meet Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran. Photo: Reuters
Iranian President Hassan Rowhani and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe meet Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran. Photo: Reuters

Tehran, for its part, claimed to have been set up, with its foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif saying “suspicious doesn’t begin to describe” the incident. So much, then, for hopes of mediation.

US President

Donald Trump

, who had encouraged the Japanese leader’s visit, admitted on Twitter soon afterwards that when it came to negotiating, “they are not ready, and neither are we!”

Still, the incident exposed more than just the naivety of those hoping for an Abe-led breakthrough. In raising the stakes in Washington’s confrontation with Tehran, it also threw the spotlight on Iran’s dwindling number of allies – and perhaps most significantly on its largest trading partner, China – which face mounting pressure to rethink the relationship.

Tanker attacks: world divided over Iran role as Saudi prince breaks silence
The day after the attack, China’s President

Xi Jinping

said Beijing would promote its ties with Iran “however the situation changes” – a comment made during a meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rowhani on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kyrgyzstan – but diplomatic observers question just how far China can go in accommodating its controversial trading partner.

BEST FRIENDS FOREVER?

Iran has long been able to count on support from China, which accounts for 30 per cent of the Islamic republic’s exports and imports, and its willingness to defy US pressure is a gamble at least partly based on an assumption it can continue to count on Beijing’s support.

As Iran’s largest economic partner – Chinese direct investment in Iran hit a record high of nearly US$4 billion last year, according to data analysis project ChinaMed – Beijing already plays a key role in relieving US pressure on Iran, said Mohsen Shariatinia, assistant professor of regional studies at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran.

But experts warn that reliance will come into question as China becomes increasingly hamstrung by its own problems.

China has enough problems of its own, starting with US pressure on Huawei. Photo: EPA
China has enough problems of its own, starting with US pressure on Huawei. Photo: EPA
Chief among Beijing’s headaches are its

trade war

with Washington and the related assault on its

5G

giant

Huawei

– which, as analysts point out, originally ignited over allegations it was defying US sanctions on Iran. Beijing will also be well aware of the need to keep

Saudi Arabia

, its second-biggest oil supplier and Tehran’s critic-in-chief, happy.

On the other hand, analysts say, China will be wary of being seen to abandon its old friend, as doing so would send a message to other nations at odds with Washington that they could no longer look to China as a diversification strategy.
“This could mean Chinese investment is vulnerable to US interference,” said Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, founder of Bourse Bazaar, a media company that supports business diplomacy between Europe and Iran.
Sanctions drive Iranian students away from US towards Asia
Doing so, Batmanghelidj said, would put a question mark over one of China’s most significant foreign policies of recent years – President Xi’s signature

Belt and Road Initiative

to fund infrastructure across Eurasia.

THE BELT AND ROAD QUESTION
Tensions between Iran and the US have reached boiling point in recent weeks, after the Trump administration last month ended waivers on sanctions for nations importing Iranian oil – a move the US says is aimed at making the republic “radioactive to the international community” and which Rowhani has described as an “economic war against Iran”.
So far, China has largely stuck by the Islamic Republic, continuing to buy fuel from it despite the latest wave of US sanctions on Iranian oil that followed Trump’s decision last year to withdraw the US from the landmark 2015 agreement curbing Tehran’s nuclear development.
The deal had been widely lauded as a triumph of multilateralism and the dawning of a new economic era for Iran.
US releases video of ‘Iranian forces removing unexploded mine’ from ship
Part of its eagerness to support Iran has stemmed from the Islamic Republic’s key position in the Belt and Road plan. In 2017 alone, China signed deals for more than US$15 billion in Iranian infrastructure investment, according to the

Chinese Communist Party

mouthpiece China Daily.

Planned projects include high-speed rail lines, upgrades to the nation’s electrical grid, and natural gas pipelines. The two nations have also vowed to boost bilateral trade to US$600 billion in the next seven years.
“China sees Iran as its Western gateway, where not only is it a big market in itself, but it will also be the gateway to the rest of the 
Middle East

and ultimately to Europe for China,” said Anoush Ehteshami, professor of international relations at Durham University in Britain.

Nisha Mary Mathew, at the Middle East Institute in Singapore, said that China’s relationship with Iran was not just economic – but primarily strategic, with both nations envisioning an international order that was no longer dominated by the US and its Western allies.
DEFIANCE, FOR NOW
If the belt and road gives China good reason to stick with Iran, there are plenty of voices urging just that action. As Andrea Ghiselli at Shanghai’s Fudan University pointed out, US sanctions until now have only strengthened the hardline factions in Iran’s government.
The combination of the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal – which had the support of the international community – along with Europe’s tepid efforts to rescue it, may have emboldened those favouring resistance over negotiation.
Xi’s supportive comments in Kyrgyzstan were only the latest in a string of remarks from China that could encourage such factions.
If Trump kills off Huawei, do Asia’s 5G dreams die?
After China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Beijing last month, the ministry’s spokesman Lu Kang said China’s economic relationship with Iran was “reasonable and lawful”.
Two months prior to that, China’s Minister of Commerce Zhong Shan, while hosting his Iranian counterpart Farhad Dejpasand, had claimed China’s “determination to maintain and develop the China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership is unshakeable”.
Chinese President Xi Jinping with Iranian President Hassan Rowhani. Photo: AFP
Chinese President Xi Jinping with Iranian President Hassan Rowhani. Photo: AFP

Even so, the pressure is getting to some. In February, Foreign Minister Zarif temporarily resigned, in what Andrea Ghiselli at Fudan University in Shanghai called a clear sign of the “changing and precarious power balance with Iran’s foreign policy establishment”.

And nowhere is the pressure felt more keenly than the economy and China’s ability to serve as a lifeline.

“The real anxiety in Iran right now is about market share,” said Bourse and Bazaar’s Batmanghelidj. “If you’re exporting zero oil and your customers are buying oil elsewhere, you lose market share.

“The government wants to know if it agreed to go back to the negotiating table and the US promised sanctions relief, that there are people who are going to buy in significant volume.”

TURNING POINT: HUAWEI

For many analysts, the event most likely to have changed the equation in Beijing’s eyes is the arrest by the Canadian authorities of 

Meng Wanzhou

, the chief financial officer of Chinese telecom giant Huawei.

Meng’s arrest came at the request of the US government, which claimed her company had violated sanctions by selling equipment to Iran.
Many observers saw the action as Washington’s way of signalling to Chinese companies that they would face repercussions if they eased the pressure on Iran by continuing to trade.
Huawei’s chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou. Photo: Reuters
Huawei’s chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou. Photo: Reuters

“Going after Huawei was about going after Chinese enterprises – signalling that they can no longer trade with Iran with impunity,” Batmanghelidj said.

Since then, Chinese firms have shown increased skittishness towards trading with Iran. According to China’s General Customs Administration, Chinese exports to Iran declined by more than half between October 2018 and February 2019, from over US$1 billion to just under US$500 million.

Mohammad Ali Shabani, a researcher at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, said other countries in the region were now watching to see if China would blink in the face of US pressure. “This could have dire consequences for China’s image as a reliable partner,” he said.

NOT JUST ABOUT AMERICA

There are reasons beyond US pressure that may factor into Beijing’s thinking. It has long stated its opposition to Iranian nuclear weapons development, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said that China is “ready” to take on “its due responsibilities and make a greater contribution to world peace and common development”.

Trade war: here are Beijing’s options – and none look any good

Zhao Hong, at the Research School of Southeast Asian Studies at Xiamen University, said that in stepping up as a responsible world power Beijing faced a dilemma over its approach to Iran.
“Chinese leaders have to painfully balance an impulse towards economic cooperation with Iran against other vital interests, including convincing Washington that China is a responsible stakeholder,” he wrote in the Journal of Contemporary China.
Saudi Aramco's Ras Tanura oil refinery. The country is China’s second-largest oil supplier after Russia. Photo: Reuters
Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura oil refinery. The country is China’s second-largest oil supplier after Russia. Photo: Reuters

Then there is China’s relationship with Iran’s chief adversary, Saudi Arabia, to consider. Riyadh is China’s second-largest oil supplier, behind Russia, and it plays a central role in Beijing’s energy strategy.

According to International Trade Centre data, more than 12 per cent of China’s imported oil came from Saudi Arabia last year, compared with just 6 per cent from Iran. Last year, Saudi Arabia shipped 56.73 million tonnes of oil to China, or 1.135 million barrels per day.

Why would Kim Jong-un trust Trump, now that he’s ripped up Iran’s nuclear deal?

This April, China imported 6.3 million tonnes of oil from Saudi Arabia, nearly twice the 3.24 million tonnes it imported from Iran, according to China’s General Administration of Customs.

Iran’s comparatively small share of China’s oil imports market and its heavy reliance on China as a trading partner add up to a deeply uneven relationship, experts say, and it is this imbalance that will encourage the US that China may be open to rethinking its ties.

As Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East programme at Washington DC think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, pointed out, while China was Iran’s largest trading partner, Iran represented less than 1 per cent of China’s international trade.

“Iran needs China,” Alterman said. “But to China, Iran is expendable.”

Source: SCMP

Law of Unintended Consequences

continuously updated blog about China & India

ChiaHou's Book Reviews

continuously updated blog about China & India

What's wrong with the world; and its economy

continuously updated blog about China & India