Archive for ‘Politics’

21/11/2013

Pan-Asian history textbooks struggle to find common language – FT.com

For decades, disagreements over regional history have been a blight on diplomacy between Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul.

Now, South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye has revived a proposal aimed at soothing the long-running row over the region’s history: a shared syllabus of northeast Asian history, to be used as the basis for teaching in all three countries.

Yet while academics view the idea as desirable in principle, most also dismiss it as unfeasible for the foreseeable future – reflecting a continuing deterioration in regional relations, with festering historical grudges at the core.

Japanese school history books have long been seen by South Korean and Chinese critics as emblematic of efforts to downplay atrocities during Japan’s imperial expansion. Politicians in Seoul complain of a failure to address the wartime sexual enslavement of thousands of Korean women, while Beijing has railed at suggestions that Japan occupied Manchuria in response to Chinese provocations.

The historical grievances have intensified since the election last year of the nationalist prime minister Shinzo Abe, whose provocative remarks have included questioning the notion that Japan truly “invaded” Asian countries such as China and Korea.

In her proposal for a shared history syllabus, unveiled at a conference last week in Seoul, Ms Park cited precedents set by Germany, France and Poland. “We may see the removal of the wall of historical problems, which is the seed of conflict and distrust,” she said.

Japanese education minister Hakubun Shimomura – widely seen as one of Mr Abe’s more rightwing cabinet members – said he “openly welcomed” the suggestion. He added that he hoped it could serve as a catalyst for high-level talks between the three governments, something Mr Abe’s administration has been seeking with little success. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman was more cautious, stressing the need for Japan to “adjust its attitude and gain the trust of its Asian neighbours”.

Ms Park’s spokeswoman presents the proposal as part of her drive for a “northeast Asian peace and co-operation initiative” – but in fact politicians and scholars from the three countries have been toying with this idea for years.

In 1997, Seoul and Tokyo agreed to set up a joint committee of historians whose research could form the basis for educational texts – but the body’s work over the ensuing years “just confirmed how deep are the differences between the historical views of the two peoples”, says Lee Gil-sang, a professor at the Academy of Korean Studies in Seoul.

After four years of work, a 2010 report by a similar Sino-Japanese body exposed a rift over Japan’s historical claim to the Okinawa island group – a debate with implications for the countries’ fierce dispute over the Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyu in China.

“It is urgent and necessary to have [a joint history] book considering the growing territorial disputes,” says Su Zhiliang, a professor at Shanghai Normal University who edits Chinese history textbooks.

While officially sponsored efforts have made limited headway, private initiatives have borne more fruit. A group of Chinese, Japanese and South Korean historians jointly produced a history book in 2007, and a second such project was published in all three countries last year. Yet neither text was embraced by any of the three countries’ school authorities.

“The main focus of history teaching in this region is to promote patriotism,” says Mr Lee.

via Pan-Asian history textbooks struggle to find common language – FT.com.

21/11/2013

As Xi Jinping Reforms China, Expect Power Consolidation, Not Democracy – Businessweek

Chinese President Xi Jinping is all about reform. That’s “reform” as in “kicking butt.” The main take-away from the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee is that Xi has consolidated power remarkably quickly and is eager to use it. Some parts of his agenda impress outsiders, such as further relaxing the one-child policy and closing reeducation labor camps. Such steps defuse popular anger toward the regime. Other Xi initiatives are decidedly less appealing, like the vow to “utilize and standardize Internet supervision,” which is code language for censorship. But whether liked or disliked outside China, everything Xi intends to do is directed toward one goal: to consolidate the Communist Party’s central and permanent role as the leader of the nation.

As Xi Jinping Reforms China, Expect Power Consolidation, Not Democracy

Democracy is the yielding of power from the party to the people. That’s not what Xi wants. He wants to gather power inward on the theory that only a strong leader can govern a country in which the mountains are high and the emperor is far away. Getting local governments to toe the line “requires a lot of political brute force, and it’s something you can only achieve if you are extremely vigorous,” says Arthur Kroeber, Beijing-based managing director of economic research firm GK Dragonomics. Kroeber says Xi’s anticorruption campaign seems to warn, “Look, this is the way it’s going to be, and if you don’t like it, we have a lot of space in the jails for you.”

The theme of the third party plenum, held on Nov. 9-12, was “reform and opening up.” That’s a phrase consciously copied from an earlier third party plenum—the one in December 1978 at which Deng Xiaoping began to launch China into the global economy. Deng helped lift hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, giving the world’s most populous nation what is now the world’s second-biggest economy. Xi wants to show his countrymen he’s determined to carry on Deng’s legacy, yet he draws inspiration from the man Deng repudiated: Chairman Mao Zedong. Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, fought alongside Mao. According to the official story, Mao saved him from execution, and the elder Xi repaid the favor by sheltering Mao and his troops at the end of the Long March retreat from the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

As a princeling, Xi is determined to demonstrate his ties to the founding generation. Intent on returning China to a purer past, he has presided over a crackdown on corruption that has netted senior party officials—even as members of his own extended family have become rich. He’s brought back the Maoist notion of a “mass line” that enforces ideological discipline by requiring officials to “listen to the people,” introspect, and cleanse themselves of any deviations from party doctrine. He isn’t making it easy for the people to speak, though; in September, China’s top court said Web users could face jail time if “defamatory” rumors they put online were read by more than 5,000 people or reposted more than 500 times.

Xi doesn’t trumpet his differences from his predecessors as an American would. Chinese leaders worry that the people will lose faith in the party if it seems to be swerving in different directions. (“Unswerving” is a big word in China.) So in its 60-point resolution, the Central Committee dutifully name-checks “Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of ‘Three Represents,’ and The Scientific Outlook on Development”—those last two being the slogans of past presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, respectively. It’s as if Barack Obama obsessively paid tribute to President George W. Bush’s “compassionate conservatism.”

via As Xi Jinping Reforms China, Expect Power Consolidation, Not Democracy – Businessweek.

21/11/2013

Is Land Reform Finally Coming to China? – Businessweek

China’s leaders raised a multitude of reforms as priorities at the plenum that closed a week ago. A key one, a change in land ownership so that farmers can more freely rent, sell, and mortgage their land, is hoped to boost China’s still laggard household consumption.

A farmer harvesting rice in Xizhou county, China

“The Party leadership has given its blessing to land reforms that should shift more income to rural households. Change will happen slowly but the result should be a boost to consumer spending,” wrote Mark Williams and Julian Evans-Pritchard, economists at London-based Capital Economics in a Nov. 20 note.

The present system dates back to the early days of the People’s Republic and classifies all rural land as collectively owned. That murky status restricts farmers from selling the land they live on, while local governments are largely free to take it—sometimes forcibly—and convert it to industrial and commercial uses, providing a key source of their income.

Authorities usually sell the seized land for 18 times what they paid the farmers, estimates Li Ping, senior attorney at the Beijing office of Landesa, a Seattle-based nonprofit that focuses on land-rights issues. This contributes to rising social instability, with farmers protesting land grabs, and it keeps the rural population poor, Bloomberg Businessweek reported earlier this year.

It can’t all be labeled rapacious land-grabbing, however. With local governments responsible for 80 percent of spending, including for their citizens’ education, health, and pensions—but getting only about 40 percent of China’s total tax revenues, according to World Bank estimates—the reliance on alternate sources of revenues such as land sales is understandable. According to China’s Ministry of Finance, local governments’ land-sale proceeds totaled 2.67 trillion yuan ($438 billion) last year, equivalent to more than half their total tax revenue, Bloomberg News reported on Sept. 24.

“With farmers and collectives now barred from selling rural land, expropriation of land has been a significant source of revenue for local governments,” wrote the Capital Economics economists. “They rezone it for commercial, industrial or residential use, add some infrastructure and sell it on. Industrial firms are often offered land at a low price as an incentive to set up in an area. Local governments benefit by taxing these firms’ activities.”

via Is Land Reform Finally Coming to China? – Businessweek.

21/11/2013

After Stingy Aid to Typhoon Haiyan Victims, China Tries Damage Control – Businessweek

With a relief team finally on its way to the Philippines, China is trying to control the damage from its petty response to the Typhoon Haiyan tragedy.

A 17-member disaster relief team from the China Red Cross prepares to depart for the Philippines, in Beijing, on Nov. 20

The Chinese group is getting there late because of political differences between the two governments. The storm may have killed thousands of people and brought to a halt a large swath of China’s neighbor to the south, but since the world’s new economic giant is feuding with the Philippines about disputed islands in the South China Sea, the leadership in Beijing decided to take advantage of a humanitarian catastrophe to teach President Benigno Aquino who’s boss.

China initially offered a paltry $100,000 in aid and, after an international outcry, raised that figure to $1.6 million. It’s as if Dr. Evil decided to go into the disaster-relief business: “One point six million dollars!” Hence the headlines worldwide expressing outrage that China, the world’s second-largest economy, was offering less money than do-it-yourself furniture maker Ikea.

Not the ideal message for a country trying to persuade its neighbors of its trustworthiness. China’s ham-fisted response to Haiyan is a welcome gift for Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe, who has spent much of his first year in office touring countries in the region that have good reason to worry about China’s intentions.

That’s probably why China’s officials and media are trying to change the narrative. Chinese relief workers are on their way to the Philippines now, China’s Foreign Ministry announced today—a week and a half after Haiyan hit. But not to worry, some Chinese blankets and tents started arriving on Monday and Tuesday. “China will also send a medical boat Peace Ark, which belongs to the Chinese navy, to the Philippines,” the Xinhua news agency reported today. “The boat, which has good medical rescue capability and maneuverability, will depart soon.”

Even as the Chinese relief effort finally gets underway, there’s a new message: China is actually the victim here, hurt by Philippine bureaucrats. According to Xinhua, China was slow because the Philippine government hadn’t given its blessing. Indeed, the state-run news agency reported yesterday the emergency medical team was “ready to go” and would “depart for the disaster areas immediately, once China gets permission from the Philippines.”

via After Stingy Aid to Typhoon Haiyan Victims, China Tries Damage Control – Businessweek.

21/11/2013

China Supreme Court rules out confession through torture | Reuters

Using torture to extract confessions must be eliminated, China\’s Supreme People\’s Court said on Thursday, singling out a widespread practice that has long attracted international condemnation.

Policemen guard the entrance outside Shandong Province Supreme People's Court in Jinan, Shandong province, October 25, 2013. REUTERS/Aly Song

\”Inquisition by torture used to extract a confession, as well as the use of cold, hunger, drying, scorching, fatigue and other illegal methods to obtain confessions from the accused must be eliminated,\” the Supreme Court said in a statement posted on its official microblog account.

The Supreme People\’s Court also introduced more stringent rules for death penalty cases, saying adequate evidence must be furnished and that only experienced judges should handle capital punishment trials.

China\’s government said last week it would work to reduce the number of crimes subject to the death penalty.

via China Supreme Court rules out confession through torture | Reuters.

21/11/2013

Paranoia from Soviet Union collapse haunts China’s Communist Party

20/11/2013

The party plenum: Everybody who loves Mr Xi, say yes | The Economist

COMMUNIST Party plenums are rituals of unchanging arcana. The closed-door, four-day conclave of some 370 senior party leaders that ended in Beijing on November 12th was a typical example, as usual summing up its decisions in a gnomic communiqué full of ambiguities. Yet a parsing of the document suggests President Xi Jinping (pictured above, centre) is tightening his grip on power, and with it his ability to achieve breakthroughs in economic and social reforms.

China’s state-controlled media have hailed the meeting, known as the third plenum of the 18th Central Committee, as “a new historical starting point”. Global Times, an English-language newspaper, said it was just as important as the most famous plenum in the party’s history, which brought Deng Xiaoping to power in 1978 and ushered in profound changes that turned China into the world’s second-largest economy. There is little in the communiqué to back such bullish assertions, but the summary of the proceedings offers hope that the pace of reform will pick up.

For the first time in such a document, the party has called for markets to play a “decisive” role in the allocation of resources. This has been glossed by official media as a step up from previous party language that described the role of market forces as merely “basic”. This new language, according to an academic quoted by Global Times, aroused much debate during preparations for the plenum. Semantics can be very important. The party’s decision in 1992 to create a “socialist market economy”, not just a socialist one, caused an upsurge of reformist zeal, including the privatisation or closure of tens of thousands of state-owned enterprises, as well as market-opening measures that paved the way for accession to the World Trade Organisation a decade later.

As expected, this week’s communiqué contained few indications of specific new policies. These will become clearer in a few days or weeks when the resolution is published, and after senior economic officials meet in December to decide on the country’s economic strategy for the year ahead. There was no mention of financial reforms to allow market forces to determine interest and exchange rates, which many economists view as crucial. On rural land reform, also closely watched, the document merely repeated language introduced at a plenum five years ago about the need to unify urban and rural property markets. Despite its reassuring words about the role of the market, it said the state sector should remain the “main body” of the economy, an odd concept, especially since China’s GDP is now largely generated by the private sector.

But at party plenums, repetition of familiar language is not necessarily a sign of inertia. The meeting in 1978 was laden with Mao-era rhetoric, but led to the ditching of Mao’s economic policies. More important were the signals it sent about Deng’s grip on power, including the return to central roles of many of Deng’s allies who had been purged by Mao. The just-concluded plenum announced two institutional changes that suggest Mr Xi has moved fast to consolidate his position.

The first of these is the setting up of a “state-security committee”. Details of this have not been revealed. It may be Mr Xi’s attempt to rein in a security apparatus that had become too powerful in recent years. Some of its functions are expected to mirror those of America’s National Security Council, which advises the president on foreign policy and tries to ensure that all government agencies are well co-ordinated. China’s new body is thought likely to include representatives from the army and police as well as ministries responsible for foreign and economic affairs. It would be a sign of Mr Xi’s growing power if he has at last persuaded the security forces to act more in concert with the rest of the bureaucracy.

The other notable change is the establishment of a “leading small group” to supervise reforms. Such groups count. They report to the Politburo and help to form and implement policy decisions. Again, no details have been given of the new body, but it could help to overcome bureaucratic rivalries that often stymie reforms. It may even be chaired by Mr Xi. The communiqué calls for “decisive results” by 2020 in unspecified “important areas” of reform.

Not surprisingly, given a fierce crackdown on political dissent in recent months, the document said little about political reform (although for the first time in the history of party plenums, Chinese television indulged in a show of glasnost by broadcasting scenes of group discussions, though participants’ voices could not be heard). The communiqué favourably mentions democracy 12 times, but plenum-watchers learned long ago that this particular count is best ignored.

via The party plenum: Everybody who loves Mr Xi, say yes | The Economist.

20/11/2013

The Trouble With China’s Reform Plan – Businessweek

The Chinese leadership’s 60-point reform plan announced two days after the close of the Communist Party of China’s third plenum on Nov. 15 went way beyond most expectations. It proposes sweeping changes across broad swathes of the economy, dealing with all of the critical issues and challenges facing China as it reaches for the next stage of development.

The plan’s overarching goals hit all the right reformist notes: “The core issue is to handle the relationship between government and the market”; “In allocating resources the market must play a decisive role”; China “must actively and steadily push forward the breadth and depth of market-oriented reforms,” and “vigorously develop a mixed-ownership economy” (meaning the private sector along with state-owned), says the document, formally called the “Decision on major issues concerning comprehensively deepening reforms.”

The optimists, who have long said the new leadership would meet their lofty expectations and deliver a new vision at the plenum, clearly have been vindicated. The plenum also shows that the new leaders, and Party Secretary Xi Jinping in particular, have decided that major reform is necessary for the continued growth of the Chinese economy. (We already knew that’s where Premier Li Keqiang’s allegiances were.) Good news indeed.

This, however, doesn’t change what has always been true: Defining what specific policies will be adopted to carry out these sweeping reforms, and even more, implementing them, will be extremely difficult. Each of the reforms will have costs for, and adversely affect powerful players in, the Chinese system. The party leaders have set the year 2020 as a target for implementing all of this, presumably in a nod to how tough it will be. And, of course, there’s no guarantee that these reforms won’t be delayed or even abandoned, as the scale of the obstacles ahead becomes more and more apparent.

Very quickly the reforms will come head to head with vested interests that stand to lose huge power. Those include state enterprises, local governments, banks, well-connected princelings, security authorities, and ultimately the party itself.

That is the central paradox of what has been proposed: On the one hand, China can’t continue growing the way it has, and indeed risks social and economic fracture if these reforms aren’t carried out. On the other hand, by pursuing these reforms the party is diluting its control in multiple ways: its privileged role controlling the purse strings, if more and more lending is to go through non-state banks; its leading position guiding the economy’s development, if the private sector starts to move into areas long controlled by state enterprises; and increasingly its sway over the people, as the party loosens the hukou and allows migrants to move more freely where they want, and as it gives farmers more power over the land they occupy. (All with the associated possibility of greater social unrest if huge new numbers of people flow into the cities and feel less inclined to be quiet when they feel the state has mistreated them.)

via The Trouble With China’s Reform Plan – Businessweek.

20/11/2013

China Legal Reform Promises Cause for Cautious Optimism – China Real Time Report – WSJ

The initial communiqué that emanated from China’s major meeting of top Communist Party leaders on November 12th focused on economic reform and had little to say about the legal realm. That changed three days later when the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party released a 60-point “resolution” that announced two potentially significant legal reforms and provided more detail about additional reform targets.

While it’s only possible to gauge the transformation of rhetoric into action after the fact, I’m not alone in welcoming the new goals. I recently attended a long-planned meeting in Seattle of a group of specialists on Chinese law. The meeting began on November 14, and the mood was discouraged given the scarcity of references to legal institutions in the communiqué. By the next morning, however, the atmosphere shifted as details of the just-released resolution trickled in.

The resolution specifically mentions two potentially important reforms: abolition of the system of “re-education through labor” (in Chinese: laojiao) and a plan to move the courts and the procuracy (prosecutors) away from the influence of local governments.

Laojiao, initiated in 1957, is a system under which the police may send people to labor camps for up to four years without formal arrest or trial.  Initially established to deal with recidivist petty criminals who would otherwise burden the courts, it has been extensively used to incarcerate “counter-revolutionary” dissidents, aggressive petitioners, members of the Falun Gong religious movement and other persons deemed to present unwelcome political challenges to CCP rule. It has long provoked criticism by Chinese legal scholars, other advocates of legal reform and members of the public.

via China Legal Reform Promises Cause for Cautious Optimism – China Real Time Report – WSJ.

20/11/2013

Reimagining India | McKinsey & Company

India’s rising economy and burgeoning middle class have earned it a place alongside China as one of the world’s indispensable emerging markets. But what is India’s true potential? And what can be done to unlock it?

Reimagining India

In Reimagining India: Unlocking the Potential of Asia’s Next Superpower, McKinsey brings together leading thinkers from around the world to explore and debate the challenges and opportunities facing the country. The book’s contributors include CNN’s Fareed Zakaria; Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates; Google chairman Eric Schmidt; Mukesh Ambani, the CEO of India’s largest private conglomerate; Harvard Business School dean Nitin Nohria; and Nandan Nilekani, cofounder of Infosys and chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India, as well as a host of other leading executives, entrepreneurs, economists, foreign-policy experts, journalists, historians, and cultural luminaries.

As the foreword notes, “While McKinsey consultants have contributed a few essays to this volume, Reimagining India is not the product of a McKinsey study; neither is it meant as a ‘white paper’ nor coherent set of policy proposals. Rather, our aim was to create a platform for others to engage in an open, free-wheeling debate about India’s future.”

via Reimagining India | McKinsey & Company.

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