WSJ: “China’s ‘princelings,’ the offspring of the communist party elite, are embracing the trappings of wealth and privilege—raising uncomfortable questions for their elders.
English: People’s daily, on 1 October, 1949, the day of the establishment of China, P. R. 中文: 1949年10月1日，中华人民共和国建国时的《人民日报》头版 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
… State-controlled media portray China’s leaders as living by the austere Communist values they publicly espouse. But as scions of the political aristocracy carve out lucrative roles in business and embrace the trappings of wealth, their increasingly high profile is raising uncomfortable questions for a party that justifies its monopoly on power by pointing to its origins as a movement of workers and peasants.
Their visibility has particular resonance as the country approaches a once-a-decade leadership change next year, when several older princelings are expected to take the Communist Party’s top positions. That prospect has led some in Chinese business and political circles to wonder whether the party will be dominated for the next decade by a group of elite families who already control large chunks of the world’s second-biggest economy and wield considerable influence in the military.
“There’s no ambiguity—the trend has become so clear,” said Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese elite politics at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Princelings were never popular, but now they’ve become so politically powerful, there’s some serious concern about the legitimacy of the ‘Red Nobility.’ The Chinese public is particularly resentful about the princelings’ control of both political power and economic wealth.” …
The antics of some officials’ children have become a hot topic on the Internet in China, especially among users of Twitter-like micro-blogs, which are harder for Web censors to monitor and block because they move so fast. In September, Internet users revealed that the 15-year-old son of a general was one of two young men who crashed a BMW into another car in Beijing and then beat up its occupants, warning onlookers not to call police. An uproar ensued, and the general’s son has now been sent to a police correctional facility for a year, state media report.
Top Chinese leaders aren’t supposed to have either inherited wealth or business careers to supplement their modest salaries, thought to be around 140,000 yuan ($22,000) a year for a minister. Their relatives are allowed to conduct business as long as they don’t profit from their political connections. In practice, the origins of the families’ riches are often impossible to trace.
Last year, Chinese learned via the Internet that the son of a former vice president of the country—and the grandson of a former Red Army commander—had purchased a $32.4 million harbor-front mansion in Australia. He applied for a permit to tear down the century-old mansion and to build a new villa, featuring two swimming pools connected by a waterfall.
Many princelings engage in legitimate business, but there is a widespread perception in China that they have an unfair advantage in an economic system that, despite the country’s embrace of capitalism, is still dominated by the state and allows no meaningful public scrutiny of decision making.
The state owns all urban land and strategic industries, as well as banks, which dole out loans overwhelmingly to state-run companies. The big spoils thus go to political insiders who can leverage personal connections and family prestige to secure resources, and then mobilize the same networks to protect them.
The People’s Daily, the party mouthpiece, acknowledged the issue last year, with a poll showing that 91% of respondents believed all rich families in China had political backgrounds. A former Chinese auditor general, Li Jinhua, wrote in an online forum that the wealth of officials’ family members “is what the public is most dissatisfied about.”
One princeling disputes the notion that she and her peers benefit from their “red” backgrounds. “Being from a famous government family doesn’t get me cheaper rent or special bank financing or any government contracts,” Ye Mingzi, a 32-year-old fashion designer and granddaughter of a Red Army founder, said in an email. “In reality,” she said, “the children of major government families get very high scrutiny. Most are very careful to avoid even the appearance of improper favoritism.”
For the first few decades after Mao’s 1949 revolution, the children of Communist chieftains were largely out of sight, growing up in walled compounds and attending elite schools such as the Beijing No. 4 Boys’ High School, where the elder Mr. Bo and several other current leaders studied.
In the 1980s and ’90s, many princelings went abroad for postgraduate studies, then often joined Chinese state companies, government bodies or foreign investment banks. But they mostly maintained a very low profile.
Now, families of China’s leaders send their offspring overseas ever younger, often to top private schools in the U.S., Britain and Switzerland, to make sure they can later enter the best Western universities. Princelings in their 20s, 30s and 40s increasingly take prominent positions in commerce, especially in private equity, which allows them to maximize their profits and also brings them into regular contact with the Chinese and international business elite. …
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904491704576572552793150470.html
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