Posts tagged ‘Communist Party’

16/06/2014

China aims to revamp justice system but Communist Party to retain control | Reuters

Legal reforms are a key platform for President Xi Jinping‘s government to restore popular faith in the Party and judicial system amid simmering public discontent over miscarriages of justice often caused by officialsabuse of power.

Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks at the opening ceremony of the sixth ministerial meeting of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing June 5, 2014. REUTERS/Ng Han Guan/Pool

China must “improve the requirements for appointing justices and prosecutors while upholding the principles of leading party officials and respecting the rule of justice”, an unnamed official in the top office in charge of judicial reforms told the official Xinhua news agency.

It did not say when the pilot programs would be launched.

To limit interference by local governments, provincial governments will pick judges and prosecutors and fix the budgets of local courts and procuratorates, Xinhua reported. The system currently gives local governments greater sway in appointments.

Panels of legal specialists at the provincial level will nominate judges and prosecutors, but the Party must still approve their appointments.

The reforms must “uphold the Party’s leadership,” the official said, signaling a willingness by the central leadership to improve its courts as long as the Party’s overall control is not threatened.

Critics have described the leadership’s call for greater independence for courts as a hollow gesture, because judges ultimately answer to the Party.

via China aims to revamp justice system but Communist Party to retain control | Reuters.

11/06/2014

Why Chinese Officials Are Resigning From Company Boards Left and Right – China Real Time Report – WSJ

In concept, a company’s independent directors serve to check abuse of power and protect shareholders. In practice here in China, they’re often seen as a vehicle for corruption, as companies stack their boards with government officials who accept handsome compensation for the post and do an indifferent job.

China’s central authorities have been cracking down on the phenomenon, with the Communist Party issuing a circular last October banning officials and college professors from holding second jobs. According to the state-run Xinhua news agency, as of this week, more than 200 listed companies have reported independent director resignations.

October’s directive—which also said officials could only take on such posts following a three-year cooling-off period once they leave office—isn’t the first time that the party had cracked down on such activities: In 2009 and 2011, the country’s education and finance departments also banned cadres from taking outside jobs or holding independent director posts.

Still, according to statistics from the party-controlled China Youth Daily, in a survey of 5,760 independent directors at Shenzhen and Shanghai-listed companies conducted last year, fully 45% had government backgrounds.

A Monday editorial in party mouthpiece the People’s Daily said it was important for cadres “not to mistakenly convert their public power into private power, or to mistakenly think they have captivating backgrounds, when in fact all people are seeing is their backgrounds.” Official resignations from company boards, the paper said, would be a way to “purify” the party.

The move to purge company boards of officials comes as President Xi Jinping has pushed a broader anti-corruption drive that has encompassed a crackdown on everything from lavish weddings and funerals to red carpets and even luxury mooncakes. After decades of breakneck economic growth that has disproportionately benefited companies and individuals with political connections, the party is eager to erase the notion that the country’s economic system is rigged, particularly as growth has begun to slow, political analysts say.

via Why Chinese Officials Are Resigning From Company Boards Left and Right – China Real Time Report – WSJ.

09/05/2014

Literary Leaders: Why China’s President is So Fond of Dropping Confucius – China Real Time Report – WSJ

Generous girths aside, Winston Churchill and Chinese President Xi Jinping would seem to have little in common. One was popularly elected, while the other gained power by means of a shadowy process few understand. One was a giant who made his name leading his country through war, while the other’s legacy is still very much in the making.

But the two do share one characteristic besides their robust builds: a fondness for literary allusions.

In the same way Churchill littered his legendary speeches with references to the Bible and nods to Shakespeare, Mr. Xi has displayed a tendency to lard his writings and public statements with quotations from classical Chinese literature.

Xi Jinping Getty Images

On Thursday, the overseas edition of the People’s Daily devoted itself to cataloging the Chinese leader’s literary references, running a full-page spread dedicated to explaining 13 allusions spanning the later part of Mr. Xi’s career. The aim, it said, was to explain the Chinese leader’s thoughts on “the question of cultivating morality among leading cadres.”

Some analysts have interpreted Mr. Xi’s embrace of the classics as a move akin to Churchill’s borrowing from “Henry V” in his World War II speeches: an effort to use pride in a venerable cultural tradition to rally the nation at a time of crisis.

China is not facing war, but Mr. Xi and other Chinese leaders have portrayed the Communist Party as facing a raft of daunting challenges: endemic corruption, hostility abroad and an exceedingly tricky economic transition opposed by entrenched special interests. Having long ago traded in Marxism for the market, analysts say, the party is now trying to shore up its legitimacy by associating itself with a Confucian tradition it once lambasted as feudal and backwards.

Some of Mr. Xi’s references cited by the People’s Daily have more obvious resonances with today’s politics than others.

One quote Mr. Xi used from the Confucian “Book of Rites” in a 2007 essay speaks directly to his current efforts to clean up the behavior of China’s wayward bureaucrats: “Nothing is more visible than what is hidden, and nothing is more obvious than what is minute. Therefore a gentleman is careful of himself even when alone.”

In other instances, however, Mr. Xi’s allusions are less pointed, instead evoking an inchoate political anxiety. Such was the case during a 2013 visit to the Central Party School, when he quoted a line from the “Book of Songs,” another Confucian classic: “In fear and trembling, as if walking on thin ice, as if approaching a deep abyss.”

Mr. Xi is by no means the first Chinese leader to weave classical literature into his essays and speeches. Nor is he the first to attempt to leaven the Communist Party’s rhetoric with a sprinkling of Confucianism. Mr. Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao similarly borrowed from Confucius when he introduced the notion of a “harmonious society” more than a decade ago, notes Sam Crane, a professor of Asian Studies at Williams College. But Mr. Xi, Mr. Crane says, “is being more explicit and direct in his classicism.”

The People’s Daily spread, he adds, is “a rather obvious attempt to bolster [Xi’s] image as a proper gentleman in old Confucian terms: well read, morally upright and finding moral inspiration in the classic texts.”

In a country where even mundane conversations are often shot through with pithy aphorisms taken from classical literature, it makes sense for Mr. Xi show off his sophistication. Yet there could be some danger in reviving the classical texts, which are often vague, shot through with allegory and open to a wide range of interpretations.

Take, for example, this famous quote from Confucius’ Analects that appears in an essay by Mr. Xi on poverty alleviation: “It’s easier to rob an army of its general than it is to rob a common man of his purpose and will.”

According the People’s Daily, Mr. Xi intention in evoking the passage was to encourage officials to cultivate the willpower necessary to “push ahead in the face of innumerable challenges.” But Mr. Crane notes that it might be read differently, particularly in light of the upcoming 25th anniversary of the crackdown on student protesters in Tiananmen Square.

“We should not assume that the state is the articulator of those purposes and will,” he says. “And, indeed, 25 years ago there was a rather massive divergence in the expression of popular purposes and state power.”

via Literary Leaders: Why China’s President is So Fond of Dropping Confucius – China Real Time Report – WSJ.

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06/05/2014

China’s Campaign Against Foreign Words | World Affairs Journal

My guess is that this anti-English jargon campaign will be just as successful as the French one a few years ago.

“Twice in late April, People’s Daily railed against the incorporation of acronyms and English words in written Chinese. “How much have foreign languages damaged the purity and vitality of the Chinese language?” the Communist Party’s flagship publication asked as it complained of the “zero-translation phenomenon.”

So if you write in the world’s most exquisite language—in my opinion, anyway—don’t even think of jotting down “WiFi,” “MBA,” or “VIP.” If you’re a fan of Apple products, please do not use “iPhone” or “iPad.” And never ever scribble “PM2.5,” a scientific term that has become popular in China due to the air pollution crisis, or “e-mail.”

China’s communist culture caretakers are cheesed, perhaps by the unfairness of the situation. They note that when English absorbs Chinese words, such as “kung fu,” the terms are romanized. When China copies English terms, however, they are often adopted without change, dropped into Chinese text as is.

This is not the first time Beijing has moaned about foreign terms. In 2010 for instance, China Central Television banned “NBA” and required the on-air use of “US professional basketball association.” The irony is that the state broadcaster consistently uses “CCTV” to identify itself, something that has not escaped the attention of China’s noisy online community.

In response to the new language campaign, China’s netizens naturally took to mockery and sarcasm last month. They posted fictitious conversations using ungainly translations for the now shunned foreign terms. On Weibo, China’s microblogging service, they held a “grand competition to keep the purity of the Chinese language.” The consensus was that People’s Daily was once again promoting the ridiculous and impractical, as the substituted Chinese translations were almost always longer and convoluted.

The derision has not stopped China’s policymakers from taking extraordinary steps to defend their language. In 2012, the Chinese government established a linguistics committee to standardize foreign words. In 2013, it published the first ten approved Chinese translations for terms such as WTO, AIDS, and GDP, ordering all media to use them. A second and third series of approved terms are expected this year. How French.

There is a bit of obtuseness in all these elaborate efforts. As People’s Daily, China’s most authoritative publication, talks about foreign terms damaging “purity and vitality,” it forgets that innovation, in the form of borrowing, is the essence of vitality. And as for “purity,” the Chinese people are not buying the Communist Party’s hypocritical argument. “Do you think simplified Chinese characters pure?” asked one blogger.

The party, starting in the early Maoist era, replaced what are now called “traditional” Chinese characters for a set of “simplified” ones, thereby making a wholesale change of the script. The new set of characters may be easier to write, but the forced adoption meant that young Chinese in the Mainland can no longer read classic works in their own language unless they have been transcribed into the new characters.

The party, it seems, is just anti-foreign. “Since the reform and opening up, many people have blindly worshipped the West, casually using foreign words as a way of showing off their knowledge and intellect,” said Xia Jixuan from the Ministry of Education, quoted in People’s Daily. “This also exacerbated the proliferation of foreign words.”

Are foreign words inherently bad? In China, unfortunately, we are seeing further evidence of the closing of Communist Party minds.

via China’s Campaign Against Foreign Words | World Affairs Journal.

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02/05/2014

Philanthropy: China’s Carnegie | The Economist

“THE problem of our age is the proper administration of wealth,” wrote Andrew Carnegie in 1889. More than a century later, the citizens of supposedly Communist China could hardly disagree. Carnegie, one of the wealthiest men of America’s Gilded Age, soon set about giving his money away, and on April 24th Jack Ma, one of the wealthiest men of China’s Gilded Age, suggested he would start to do the same. Mr Ma and Joseph Tsai, co-founders of Alibaba, an online marketplace, announced the creation of philanthropic trusts that could be worth as much as $3 billion. “Somebody has to do something,” says Mr Ma of China’s environmental and health-care problems. “Our job is to wake people up.”

It is easy to be cynical about this. The gift is a move taken straight out of a Silicon Valley public-relations playbook, ahead of Alibaba’s expected initial public offering this year, which could value the company at $150 billion. But it could still have a remarkable effect not just on China’s fast-expanding class of super-rich, but also on its government.

China’s wealthy are a notoriously stingy lot. When two of America’s best-known philanthropists, Bill Gates, who has advised Mr Ma, and Warren Buffett, visited the country in 2010, a meeting they held was notable for the number of Chinese tycoons who stayed away. Of 122 billionaires around the world who have signed the Giving Pledge promoted by Messrs Buffett and Gates, promising to give away half their wealth by the end of their lives, not a single one is Chinese, even though China now has 358 billionaires, one-fifth of the global total.

The main reason for this is fear: many have made their money in the shadows of a supposedly socialist country, so few of China’s rich are keen to identify themselves publicly. China’s princelings, related to the leadership, are often the least enthusiastic of all, especially when the regime of Xi Jinping, China’s president, is condemning corruption, albeit selectively. Having made his money more publicly, Mr Ma may be an exception, but his foundation still adds pressure on other Chinese tycoons. Mr Xi should help, by publicly applauding Mr Ma and by making all donations tax-deductible.

It is also a prompt for Mr Xi to promote civil society. With its countryside teeming with poor children needing education and old people needing health care, the regime has decided to give non-governmental organisations (NGOs) more freedom to operate, under party scrutiny. Mr Xi needs to let them play a larger, more independent role. This highlights the party’s central dilemma: it is scared of allowing independent groups of citizens to flourish and help solve problems, and yet that is exactly what China needs. As long as civil society is kept weak, China’s social problems will get worse. Passing a new charity law, stalled for years, to clarify charities’ legal status would be a useful step in the right direction.

The question for Mr Ma is how far he is prepared to nudge the regime in this direction. His public stance is, sensibly, that he wants to work with the government, not confront it. But the areas he is likely to focus on—education, health care and the environment—matter enormously, and technology can spur political change. Mr Ma recently launched kits for smartphone users to crowdsource data on poor water quality across China, a sly dose of insurrection. Carnegie became famous not just for the money he gave away and the example he set to other philanthropists, but for the way he prompted the American government to embrace education, civic programmes and social reform. Mr Ma’s money and example can do the same for China, if only the Communist Party will allow it.

via Philanthropy: China’s Carnegie | The Economist.

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02/05/2014

Agriculture: Bring back the landlords | The Economist

CHINA’S Communist Party has always had a problem with big landowners. In Communist culture, they are synonymous with evil. In January on the country’s most-watched television show—a gala at lunar new year—viewers were treated to a scene from a Mao-era ballet featuring young peasants fired with zeal for revenge against a despotic rural landlord. Some critics rolled their eyes about such a throwback to the party’s radical past, but few complained about the stereotyping of landowners. Yet when it comes to letting individual families control large tracts of farmland, Communist Party leaders are beginning to have a change of heart.

Since January last year the term “family farm” has come into vogue in the party’s vocabulary. It refers not to the myriad tiny plots, each farmed by a single family, that are characteristic of the Chinese countryside; but to much larger-scale operations of a kind more familiar elsewhere, such as Europe or America. The trigger for this was the term’s use in a Communist Party directive known as “document number one”, the name traditionally given to the party’s new-year policy pronouncement on rural issues. It said the consolidation of household plots into family farms should be given “encouragement and support”.

On his first trip outside the capital after being appointed prime minister in March last year, Li Keqiang visited a 450-hectare (1,110-acre) family farm in the coastal province of Jiangsu. He said that boosting production was impossible on the tiny plots that most rural households farm (the average is less than half a hectare). “It can only be done through concentrating the land into larger farms”, Mr Li said. With more government support, “the earth could yield gold”, he told residents; a notion that would surprise the 260m people who have left the countryside to work in cities over the last three decades. Many villages are now home mainly to the elderly and left-behind children. During a visit to Switzerland two months later Mr Li again stopped by at a family farm (of a more modest 40 hectares). Chinese media said he wanted to pick up tips from Europe’s “advanced experiences” in running them. Chen Xiwen, a senior party policymaker on rural affairs, was even quoted as saying last year that he would like China to have vast “family farms like America’s”, but that he was worried about the impact on rural employment if farmland were to be managed by so few hands.

As is often the case whenever party policy appears to shift in the countryside, reality on the ground had long been changing before official rhetoric began to catch up. (Peasants started dismantling Mao’s disastrous “people’s communes” before the party began formally doing so in 1982.) The exodus from the countryside has allowed entrepreneurial farmers to build up their holdings by renting land from neighbours who no longer need it. They have not been able to buy it since all rural land is owned “collectively” by villagers. But they have been allowed to take over the right to farm it, and keep any profits. The party does not harp on about evil landlords of yore, since the new big-farmers are, legally speaking, merely tenants. In March last year the agriculture ministry took its first survey of family farms, though it has yet even to define the term precisely. It found there were already 877,000 of them, with an average size of around 13 hectares. They covered 13% of China’s arable land. Since 2008 the area of farmland rented out to other farmers has more than tripled.

via Agriculture: Bring back the landlords | The Economist.

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11/04/2014

Chinese civil society: Beneath the glacier | The Economist

AGAINST a powerful alliance of factory bosses and Communist Party chiefs, Zeng Feiyang cuts a frail figure. Mr Zeng, who is 39, works from a windowless office in Panyu, on the edge of the southern city of Guangzhou, where he runs a non-governmental organisation (NGO) called the Panyu Migrant Workers’ Service Centre. For more than a decade his organisation has battled against the odds to defend the rights of workers in the factories of Guangdong province. For his troubles, Mr Zeng has been evicted from various premises, had his water and electricity cut off, and been constantly harassed by local officials and their thugs. Then last autumn he received a call from one such official. “The man asked if I wanted to register the NGO,” he says. “I was very surprised.”

Over the past three years other activists at unregistered NGOs have received similar phone calls from the authorities about the sensitive issue of registration, an apparently mundane bit of administrative box-ticking which in fact represents real change. China has over 500,000 NGOs already registered with the state. The number comes with a big caveat. Many NGOs are quasi-official or mere shell entities attempting to get government money. Of those genuine groups that do seek to improve the common lot, nearly all carry out politically uncontentious activities. But perhaps 1.5m more are not registered, and some of these, like Mr Zeng’s, pursue activism in areas which officials have often found worrying.

These unregistered NGOs are growing in number and influence. They are a notable example of social forces bubbling up from below in a stubbornly top-down state. The organisations could be a way for the Communist Party to co-opt the energy and resources of civil society. They could also be a means by which that energy challenges the party’s power. And so their status has big implications. Guo Hong of the Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences in Chengdu calls the liberalisation of NGO registration laws “the partial realisation of freedom of association”. Just as economic liberalisation in the early 1980s had a profound material effect, so these latest moves could have a profound social one.

via Chinese civil society: Beneath the glacier | The Economist.

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01/04/2014

China charges former senior military officer with graft: Xinhua | Reuters

China has charged former senior army officer Gu Junshan with corruption, state news agency Xinhua said, in what is likely to be the country’s worst military scandal since a vice admiral was jailed for life for embezzlement in 2006.

An unfinished residence which belongs to former People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Gu Junshan is pictured in Puyang, Henan province January 19, 2014. REUTERS/Stringer

In a renewed campaign on graft, Chinese President Xi Jinping has vowed to go after both powerful “tigers” and lowly “flies”, warning that the issue is so severe it threatens the ruling Communist Party’s survival.

Gu has been charged with corruption, taking bribes, misuse of public funds and abuse of power, Xinhua said on one of its official microblogs on Monday. He will be tried by a military court, it added.

Three sources with ties to the leadership or military, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Gu also sold military positions.

Gu has been under investigation for corruption since he was sacked as deputy director of the logistics department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2012, sources have said.

Sources told Reuters this month that Xu Caihou, 70, who retired as vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission last year and from the Communist Party’s decision-making politburo in 2012, was under virtual house arrest while helping in the probe into Gu.

As one of Gu’s main supporters in his rise through the ranks, Xu is being implicated in ignoring, or at least failing to report, Gu’s alleged misdeeds.

Reuters has not been able to reach either Xu or Gu for comment. It is not clear if they have lawyers.

via China charges former senior military officer with graft: Xinhua | Reuters.

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30/03/2014

Exclusive: China seizes $14.5 billion assets from family, associates of ex-security chief – sources | Reuters

Chinese authorities have seized assets worth at least 90 billion yuan ($14.5 billion) from family members and associates of retired domestic security tsar Zhou Yongkang, who is at the centre of China’s biggest corruption scandal in more than six decades, two sources said.

China's Public Security Minister Zhou Yongkang reacts as he attends the Hebei delegation discussion sessions at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing in this October 16, 2007 file photo. REUTERS/Jason Lee/Files

More than 300 of Zhou’s relatives, political allies, proteges and staff have also been taken into custody or questioned in the past four months, the sources, who have been briefed on the investigation, told Reuters.

The sheer size of the asset seizures and the scale of the investigations into the people around Zhou – both unreported until now – make the corruption probe unprecedented in modern China and would appear to show that President Xi Jinping is tackling graft at the highest levels.

But it may also be driven partly by political payback after Zhou angered leaders such as Xi by opposing the ouster of former high-flying politician Bo Xilai, who was jailed for life in September for corruption and abuse of power.

Zhou, 71, has been under virtual house arrest since authorities began formally investigating him late last year. He is the most senior Chinese politician to be ensnared in a corruption investigation since the Communist Party swept to power in 1949.

“It’s the ugliest in the history of the New China,” said one of the sources, who has ties to the leadership, requesting anonymity to avoid repercussions for speaking to the foreign media about elite politics.

The government has yet to make any official statement about Zhou or the case against him and it has not been possible to contact Zhou, his family, associates or staff for comment. It is not clear if any of them have lawyers.

via Exclusive: China seizes $14.5 billion assets from family, associates of ex-security chief – sources | Reuters.

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26/03/2014

China’s Three Gorges replaces top executives amid graft probe | Reuters

China’s Three Gorges Corp, which built the world’s biggest hydropower scheme, has replaced its chairman and general manager, the company said, in the latest major reshuffle of a state-owned firm as the government steps up a fight on graft.

China's Three Gorges power company CEO Cao Guangjing makes his statement before the deal signing with Energia de Portugal in Lisbon December 30, 2011. REUTERS/Jose Manuel Ribeiro

Some officials of Three Gorges, set up in 1993 to run the hydropower scheme, were guilty of nepotism, shady property deals and dodgy bidding procedures, the ruling Communist Party’s anti-graft watchdog found in February.

The scandal has reignited public anger over the $59-billion dam, which was funded by a special levy paid by all citizens.

Chairman Cao Guangjing has been removed from his position and would be assigned another job, the company said in a statement on Tuesday. It named Cao’s replacement as Lu Chun, but gave no further details.

via China’s Three Gorges replaces top executives amid graft probe | Reuters.

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