Posts tagged ‘Xi JinPing’

27/09/2013

Xi Jinping tightens his grip with echoes of Chairman Mao at his worst

The Times: “Xi Jinping has marked his first half-year as President of China by resurrecting some of the finest leadership traditions of the late Chairman Mao: public humiliation, political backstabbing and crackling paranoia between officials.

Mao Zedong (1893-1976) leader of chinese communist party

The campaign, which was given a test-run in Hebei province yesterday under the glare of Mr Xi himself, involves a revival of the widely despised “criticism and self-criticism” drives established in the post-revolutionary 1950s.

The unbearably tense sessions, which force officials to decry their own shortcomings before highlighting the faults of their closest colleagues, have been given a makeover for the early 21st century and rebranded as “Democratic Life Meetings”.

But they have lost none of their old edge. Though nominally cast as a way to bring operational problems to light, the sessions were always intended to enforce discipline. The return of the practice comes as Mr Xi appears to be channelling key tracts of rhetoric and ideology from Mao Zedong.

In his first six months at China’s helm, the new President has intensified a Mao-style control of information, he has unabashedly allowed critics of the regime to be rounded up, he has called for Mao-style indoctrination for school children and told regional officials that “revolutionary history is the best nutrition for Communists”.

Even his much vaunted anti-corruption campaign has drawn on the vocabulary employed by Mao: Mr Xi has asserted the need to bring down both the “tigers” and “flies” of corrupt officialdom in a direct echo of comments by Chairman Mao six decades ago.

Hu Xingdou, a political economist at the Beijing Institute of Technology, said that while Mr Xi’s economic policies were in the mould of the great reformer Deng Xiaoping, the new leader was a Maoist when it came politics.

The criticism sessions, which could be rolled out to affect tens of thousands of senior officials across the country, are part of Mr Xi’s reference to the overtly Maoist leadership model known as the “mass line” that seeks to focus policy on the needs of ordinary Chinese.

“At the moment, the ruling party feels it needs Maoism, and it is hard to say whether it is Xi’s own idea or not. There are too many social contradictions in China and the Party does need some type of authority in order to rule, otherwise the boat will overturn,” he said.

The latest round of criticism and self criticism sessions were conducted among the top echelon of Communist Party officials in Hebei: the 12-member provincial standing committee.

With a shirt-sleeved and unsmiling, Mr Xi quietly taking notes, and with state-run television cameras rolling, the party secretary of Hebei, Zhou Benshun, condemned a senior colleague’s personal ambition and her consuming need to look good in the eyes of supervisors. This misguided focus, he said, would lead to the local government “doing something irrelevant to the public interest”.

Obliged then to come up with a genuine set of personal failings of his own. Mr Zhou had to list his foibles as the most powerful man in Asia glowered inches away from him.

“I have not done enough to orient my achievements around ordinary people’s interests,” he said. “Sometimes my policy making is too subjective and carried out without a deep knowledge of the people. I haven’t been practical enough in my ideology. My fighting sprit is slack and my drive to work hard is falling away.”

His blunt appraisals were merely the opening gambit in a session in which nobody escaped criticism – much of it openly tailored to Mr Xi’s previous tirades against formalism, waste and corruption.

As the accusations flew, one member was accused of being too impatient, another said that the committee generally issued too many documents. With possibly negative implications for his career, the local head of the disciplinary inspection commission was accused by colleagues of underplaying the importance of punishment.

Several offered up broad condemnations of waste in the province, pointing out that Hebei had spent Rmb3.3 million (£335,000) hiring celebrities to sing and dance at the New Year Evening Gala in February.

Sun Ruibin’s self criticism, meanwhile, appeared carefully attuned to the public disgust at corrupt officials. “As a municipal party secretary I was given a big cross-country 4×4 car,” he said. “I felt perfectly at ease about it, although it was in clear violation of rules and regulations.”

In its write-up of the Hebei sessions, Chinese state media quoted a senior Hebei official who, perhaps unsurprisingly, felt that the revival of the criticism and self-criticism seminars was a good thing.

“After we were promoted and were officials for a long time … we started feeling good and arrogant,” he said, “We began just glancing at ‘shop fronts’ and rarely checking out ‘the backyards’ and ‘corners’ during inspection trips.””

via Xi Jinping tightens his grip with echoes of Chairman Mao at his worst | The Times.

24/09/2013

China to audit military officials in move to fight graft

SCMP: “Chinese military officials will have to undergo an audit before they can retire or be promoted, state media reported on Tuesday, in the latest measure in the leadership’s campaign against corruption.

china_pla_officers.jpg

The audit will encompass officials’ “real estate property, their use of power, official cars and service personnel”, the Xinhua news agency reported, citing a guideline issued by the Central Military Commission.

The guideline aims to improve the “work style” of military officials and fight against graft, the report said.

President Xi Jinping has called corruption a threat to the Communist Party’s very survival, and vowed to go after powerful “tigers” as well as lowly “flies”.

Xi is also chairman of the Central Military Commission and the country’s top military official.

Military officers who stand to be promoted to regimental commander-level posts and above, as well as those who plan to take up civilian posts or retire, will have to submit to an audit, the report said.

The military began replacing licence plates on its cars and trucks in April in a move to crack down on fleets of luxury vehicles that routinely run red lights, drive aggressively and fill up on free fuel.

Military plates enable drivers to avoid road tolls and parking fees and are often handed out to associates as perks or favours.

via China to audit military officials in move to fight graft | South China Morning Post.

16/09/2013

China in Central Asia: Rising China, sinking Russia

The Economist: “In a vast region, China’s economic clout is more than a match for Russia’s

LESS than a decade ago little doubt hung over where the newly independent states of Central Asia had to pump their huge supplies of oil and gas: Russia, their former imperial overlord, dominated their energy infrastructure and markets. Yet today, when a new field comes on stream, the pipelines head east, to China. As if to underline the point, this week China’s president, Xi Jinping, swept through Central Asia, gobbling up energy deals and promising billions in investment. His tour left no doubts as to the region’s new economic superpower.

In Turkmenistan, already China’s largest foreign supplier of natural gas, Mr Xi inaugurated production at the world’s second-biggest gasfield, Galkynysh. It will help triple Chinese imports from the country. In Kazakhstan $30 billion of announced deals included a stake in Kashagan, the world’s largest oil discovery in recent decades. In Uzbekistan Mr Xi and his host, President Islam Karimov, unveiled $15 billion in oil, gas and uranium deals, though details in this opaque country were few.

China is the biggest trading partner of four of the region’s five countries (the exception being Uzbekistan). During Mr Xi’s trip, Chinese state media reported that trade volumes with Central Asia topped $46 billion last year, up 100-fold since the countries’ independence from the Soviet Union two decades ago. Though neither side puts it like this, China’s growing presence clearly comes at Russia’s expense. Russia still controls the majority of Central Asia’s energy exports, but its relative economic clout in the region is slipping—other than as a destination for millions of migrant labourers. For years Russia has treated the region as its exclusive province, insisting on buying oil and gas at below-market rates through Soviet-era pipelines, while re-exporting it at a markup. The practice helped drive Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, both with huge energy reserves, into China’s arms.

Yet Russia and China have much riding on their bilateral relationship. The government in Moscow is eager to benefit from its eastern neighbour’s economic might, while in Beijing policymakers view Russia as a critical ally on the world stage. (Knowing the premium China places on protocol, it was no accident that Mr Xi’s very first official visit as president was to Moscow; and that he went to St Petersburg for the G20 summit in the middle of his Central Asian tour.) All this suggests the two giants will aim to co-operate as much as compete, at least for the moment. As for Central Asians, says Vasily Kashin, a Moscow-based China expert, Russia has accepted that “they will try to get the best deals out of this rivalry.”

When it comes to security issues in Central Asia, in public China still defers to Russia. Both look warily on as NATO withdraws from Afghanistan. China’s chief concern is the threat posed by Uighur separatists and their sympathisers in Central Asia. And so, in security matters too, China’s influence is growing. As The Economist went to press, Mr Xi was expected in Bishkek, capital of Kyrgyzstan, to attend the annual summit of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, a block which China was instrumental in founding. A chief aim is to counter the “three evil forces” of terrorism, extremism and separatism.

Arguably, Chinese investment in Central Asia promotes that goal, by improving living standards and thus stability in a region that shares a 2,800km (1,750-mile) border with Xinjiang, China’s westernmost province and Uighur homeland. Yet China’s soft power is undermined by a beast it is not good at fighting: resentment. Chinese contractors are flooding into Central Asia, building roads and pipelines and even, in Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, the government buildings. The cruel irony is not lost on the millions of unemployed men leaving for Russia to look for jobs. But it is lost, says Deirdre Tynan of the International Crisis Group, a think-tank, on policymakers. “Central Asia’s governments see China as a wealthy and willing partner, but on the ground little is being done to ease tensions between Chinese workers and their host communities,” she warns.”

via China in Central Asia: Rising China, sinking Russia | The Economist.

See also: https://chindia-alert.org/political-factors/geopolitics-chinese/

11/09/2013

China ditches pointless awards in latest anti-waste push

More austerity.

Reuters: “China said on Wednesday that it will ditch 76 pointless official – and sometimes obscure – awards as it seeks to rein in waste and extravagance, part of President Xi Jinping‘s crusade against pervasive corruption.

Government departments will, for example, no longer be able to award prizes for “excellent vocational education teaching materials” or “administration in accordance with the law” for tax collectors, according to the new rules.

“In recent years, many government departments … have been obsessed with these kinds of awards and evaluations and formalism has run rampant,” the central government said in a statement on its website (www.gov.cn).

“Not only has this not had the desired effect, it has been a huge waste of personnel and resources and has even caused unhealthy tendencies, causing a strong reaction in society.”

A similar campaign in 2009 had resulted in annual savings of 6.4 billion yuan ($1.05 billion), the government said.

“The cancelling of these 76 awards is just the first step, and the project will continue and deepen,” it added.

Plaques marking the award of such prizes and evaluations can be seen everywhere in China from ministries to parks and subways and generally have little real meaning as they are mostly given for political rather than competitive reasons.

The new rules echo demands made of officials to simplify their lives and get closer to the people by Xi since he took over as Communist Party chief last November.

He has made cutting back on ostentation and waste a key theme of his administration, seeking to assuage anger over corruption and restore faith in the party.”

via China ditches pointless awards in latest anti-waste push | Reuters.

see also: https://chindia-alert.org/2013/05/25/restraint-is-the-new-red-in-china/

11/09/2013

Changing China set to shake world economy, again

In my view, this is a ‘must read’ article for anyone interested in how China will impact their own countries and lives in the foreseeable future. It complements another recent article – https://chindia-alert.org/2013/09/11/reading-li-keqiangs-tea-leaves-at-the-world-economic-forum/

Reuters: “Long after concerns about tightening U.S. monetary policy have faded, a more profound issue will still dog global policymakers: how to handle the second stage of China’s economic revolution.

A view of the city's skyline from the Beijing Yintai Centre building at sunset is seen in Beijing, August 29, 2013. REUTERS/Jason Lee

The first phase, industrialization, shook the world. Commodity-producing countries boomed as they fed China’s endless appetite for natural resources. Six of the 10 fastest-growing economies last decade were in Africa.

China’s flood of keenly priced manufactured goods hollowed out jobs in advanced and emerging nations alike but also helped cap inflation and made an array of consumer goods affordable for tens of millions of people for the first time.

The second stage of China’s development promises to be no less momentous.

Consumption will take over the growth baton from investment. Services will grow as a share of the economy, while industry shrinks. Commodity-intensive mass manufacturing based on cheap labor will give way to greener, cleaner ways of making things.

More of the value added by a better-educated, more productive workforce harnessing new technologies will stay in China instead of going to multinational companies.

That’s the plan, anyway.

China will remain the most powerful engine of global growth for the next couple of decades, but it will no longer be just processing imported raw materials and components for re-export, said Li Jian with the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Commerce Ministry‘s think tank.

“China has realized that it cannot blindly rely on investment and exports as the main drivers of growth. So China’s demand will be more balanced,” Li said.

HIGH STAKES

To show it is serious about more sustainable growth, China deliberately engineered the first-half slowdown that unnerved markets in order to address these longer-term structural priorities, according to President Xi Jinping.

Xi and the other new leaders of China’s Communist Party are expected to approve a blueprint for reform at a plenum in November. Overcoming vested interests opposed to the new economic model will be a stern test of their credibility.

A lot is at stake for the global economy too.

Philip Schellekens, an economist with the World Bank in Washington, said the importance of the reforms Beijing intends to make cannot be overstated. As China changes, so will the rest of the world.

“The structural transformations that we think are going to happen in China over the next two decades will matter far more than the near-term vulnerabilities,” he said.

On balance, commodity-exporting developing economies stand to be affected more than rich nations – an obvious exception being Australia, where the end of a China-driven mining boom was a big issue in Saturday’s election. China buys a third of Australia’s exports.

Commodity demand should stay strong, especially as China’s capital stock per head is only 10 percent that of America’s and urbanization has a long way to go. But rebalancing will favor commodities more closely tied to consumption than to investment.

Economists fret that too many emerging markets spent their windfalls from surging raw material prices instead of sloughing them into infrastructure and other investment. As a result, growth is slowing now that China’s demand is softening.

China’s appetite for agricultural commodities and energy should hold up well but Capital Economics, a London consultancy, said it was concerned about large metals exporters that have not saved their extra income and so are running current account deficits.

It singled out South Africa, Zambia, Chile and Peru as being particularly vulnerable.

via Insight: Changing China set to shake world economy, again | Reuters.

See also: https://chindia-alert.org/economic-factors/china-needs-to-rebalance-her-economy/

08/09/2013

A Chinese power struggle: Hunting tigers

The Economist: “A DRIVE against corruption? Or a political purge? Or a bit of both? Outside China, not many people noticed the dismissal of Jiang Jiemin, the minister overseeing China’s powerful state-owned enterprises (SOEs). His charge—“serious violations of discipline”—is party-speak for corruption. Officials at CNPC, a state-run oil giant which Mr Jiang used to run, have also been charged. But in Beijing it fits a pattern. It follows on from the trial of Bo Xilai, the princeling who ran the huge region of Chongqing and was a notable rival of Xi Jinping, China’s president. Mr Xi now seems to be gunning for an even bigger beast: Zhou Yongkang, Mr Jiang’s mentor, an ally of Mr Bo’s, and until last year the head of internal security whom Mr Bo once hoped to replace.

Mr Xi vows to fight corrupt officials large and small—“tigers” and “flies” as he puts it. He has certainly made as much or more noise about graft as his predecessors. If Mr Zhou is pursued for corruption, it will break an unwritten rule that the standing committee should not go after its own members, past or present. And there are good reasons for Mr Xi to stamp out corruption. He knows that ill-gotten wealth is, to many ordinary people, the chief mark against the party. It also undermines the state’s economic power.

But this corruption drive is also open to another interpretation. To begin with, the tigers being rounded up are Mr Xi’s enemies. Mr Bo had hoped to use Chongqing as the springboard to the Politburo’s standing committee. The verdict on Mr Bo, expected any day, is a foregone conclusion. His sentence will be decided at the highest levels of the Communist Party, and it can only be harsh. Party politics, as seen by its players, is an all-or-nothing game, and the stakes are even higher when family prestige and fortunes are at stake.

Mr Xi is also open to the charge of being selective about leaving other tigers untouched. His own family’s fortune, piggy-banking off Mr Xi’s career, runs into hundreds of millions of dollars. Even as Mr Xi rails against corruption, he has overseen a crackdown on reformers calling, among other things, for the assets of senior cadres to be disclosed. And although the party makes much of how Mr Bo’s trial is the rule of law at work, many of the moves against Mr Bo, Mr Jiang and Mr Zhou appear to be taking place in a parallel and obscure system of detention for party members known as shuanggui.

Now set out your stall, Mr Xi

So China is entering a crucial period. The optimistic interpretation of all this is that Mr Xi is not just consolidating his own power but also restoring political unity. This will free him to push ahead with the deep but difficult economic reforms that he has promised and that China so badly needs if growth is not to stumble; it would also allow him to drive harder against corruption. The SOEs are bound to be part of both campaigns.

The test will come at a party plenum in November. There, Mr Xi should make it clear that even his friends are not above the law. A register of official interests would be laudable, and a few trials of people from Mr Xi’s own camp would send a message. He should also tie his campaign against graft to economic liberalisation: break up the various boondoggles and monopolies, and there will be far fewer chances for theft. It is still not clear whether Mr Xi’s “Chinese Dream” is a commitment to reform or maintaining the status quo. For China’s sake, it had better be reform.

via A Chinese power struggle: Hunting tigers | The Economist.

See also:

01/09/2013

Jiang Jiemin: China corruption probe into top official

There are increasing signs that this time, anti-corruption is being taken very seriously by the Party and government.

BBC: “Chinese authorities have announced a corruption investigation into Jiang Jiemin, the head of the commission that oversees state-owned companies.

File picture of Jiang Jiemin

The supervision ministry said Mr Jiang was suspected of a “serious violation of discipline”. He has not publicly commented on the allegations.

The term is used to refer to corruption by managers of state companies.

President Xi Jinping has vowed to eradicate corruption in China, warning that it threatens the Communist Party.

Recent months have seen several high-profile corruption cases against high-ranking officials, including disgraced senior party official Bo Xilai, who was put on trial for bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power in August.

The verdict in his case is expected “at a date to be decided”. Mr Bo denies all charges.

Until March Mr Jiang was head of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has faced a number of corruption allegations.

Last week it was announced that another four CNPC executives were under investigation for corruption.

Earlier in August the general manager of state-owned phone company China Mobile Ltd was detained in the southern province of Guangdong. He too is being investigated for discipline violations.

Internet users are also increasingly pursuing those perceived as having done wrong through online exposes and campaigns.

But in recent weeks there have been signs that this has worried the authorities, with a number of journalists arrested for “rumour-mongering” and a high-profile blogger arrested.”

via BBC News – Jiang Jiemin: China corruption probe into top official.

See also:

29/08/2013

Bo Xilai on trial: Settling scores

The Economist: “IN A heavily guarded courthouse in the eastern city of Jinan, the trial began on August 22nd of a politician who was once one of China’s most powerful figures. Bo Xilai, who is 64, has been accused of receiving bribes, embezzlement and abuse of power. His downfall in March 2012 caused the greatest political shock of its kind in decades.

That the trial is under way at last is a sign that Xi Jinping, who took over as China’s leader eight months after Mr Bo disappeared from public view, is confident that he can handle its ramifications. Mr Bo, like Mr Xi, is the son of one of Mao Zedong’s fellow revolutionaries. He remains popular in the parts of China where he has served, including as Communist Party chief in the 29m-strong region of Chongqing in the south-west. He is an icon of diehard Maoists and members of the “new left” who decry China’s move towards money making. Handling Mr Bo’s case without upsetting powerful families and arousing public ire (whether of Mr Bo’s fans or of the many Chinese who are aggrieved at widespread official corruption) has been Mr Xi’s challenge. As the trial began, dozens of supporters gathered nearby. Police dragged several away.

Mr Xi and his colleagues wished to choreograph the proceedings—which at the time of going to press were expected to last just a day or two—with great precision. But Mr Bo, with a characteristic feistiness, queered the pitch from the outset. He denied a charge of bribery involving payments of more than 1.1m yuan ($180,000) from a businessman in the north-eastern city of Dalian. His response to the other charges, including millions of dollars in other kickbacks, are not yet known. Foreign journalists were barred from the trial.

The allegations, even if disagreeable to Mr Bo, would have been tailored to suit all factions—including, to some extent, his own, for Mr Bo had powerful backers, including within the security forces. Speculation has also centred on whether the state tried to secure Mr Bo’s co-operation by promising not to go after his 25-year-old son, Bo Guagua, who was expensively educated in Britain and is now studying in America. The younger Mr Bo may hope one day to to avenge his father’s downfall.

via Bo Xilai on trial: Settling scores | The Economist.

26/08/2013

Mooncake Austerity Hits China’s Mid-Autumn Festiva

WSJ: “First baijiu, then red carpets, and now mooncakes. For Chinese government officials, the list of taboos keeps getting longer.

One month before the country celebrates its annual Mid-Autumn Festival, Chinese authorities said Wednesday that they are barring officials from buying mooncakes—a centerpiece of the holiday—as well as giving presents or hosting dinners on the public dime.

Traditionally, mooncakes are gifted (and often re-gifted) as a form of tribute during the festival, exchanged among family members as well as among companies, their clients and employees. “But this kind of polite reciprocity, when overdone, becomes a kind of squandering of cash,” ran an editorial in the People’s Daily on Thursday, praising the mooncake crackdown.

About the size of a hockey puck and traditionally stuffed with anything from red bean paste to salted egg yolk, these days, the once-humble mooncake is barely recognizable. Some are now made of solid gold and others come swathed in pure silk. Such is the luxury nature of some mooncakes that in past years, talk of a “mooncake bubble” circulated, while in 2011, China’s government proposed that workers pay income tax on the value of cakes gifted to them by their employers.

Given the frenetic pace of mooncake gift-giving, they’ve long been seen as an easy vehicle for corruption. Many environmental NGOs have also condemned the modern crop of mooncakes, criticizing their elaborate packaging as wasteful.

This week’s mooncake crackdown is part of a broader attempt to quell anger about public corruption, which in recent years has been stoked by the sight of officials gorging on lavish banquets and indulging in other excesses, including luxury watches and more. Thursday’s editorial in the People’s Daily, for example, cited the anti-mooncake move as part of President Xi Jinping’s effort to educate Party members about the evils of the “Four Winds,” i.e. “formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and waste.”

On Thursday, some users on Sina Weibo, China’s popular Twitter-like microblogging service, though, were less than impressed. “”The system doesn’t change, these kinds of trivialities aren’t of any use,” wrote one.

Others mourned the idea that the confections were facilitating corruption. “A holiday that was once simple and pure has been transformed by China’s corrupt bureaucracy into something with a different meaning,” wrote another. “How sad.”

Still others took the opportunity to rail against mooncakes in general. Despite the holiday zeal for them, many languish uneaten for weeks after they’ve been gifted. “They’re just a mix of stuff high in fat, high in sugar, and high in additives,” wrote one user.

“They’re not tasty and they’re expensive,” added another. “No wonder that other than during the Mid-Autumn festival, people don’t eat them.””

via Mooncake Austerity Hits China’s Mid-Autumn Festival – China Real Time Report – WSJ.

25/08/2013

Bo Xilai’s trial: Straying from the script

The Economist: “AS REPORTERS gathered in Jinan, the capital of the coastal province of Shandong, none (except perhaps the 19 Chinese journalists who were allowed into the courtroom, presumably because of their organisations’ unquestioning obedience to the Communist Party) had any idea how the authorities would choreograph China’s most sensational trial in decades. Still less did they know how the accused, Bo Xilai, a former member of the Politburo, would play along.

Two other trials related to Mr Bo’s case, that of his wife Gu Kailai and of his one-time police chief, Wang Lijun, suggested that the authorities would reveal only bare details of the proceedings. Those trials were conducted a year ago, before a new leadership came to power in November. Mr Bo’s case was a legacy of the outgoing regime that the incoming party chief, Xi Jinping, would rather not have inherited. But rather than follow the usual secretive pattern Mr Xi (for surely he made the decision) has allowed the court in Jinan to release lengthy transcripts of the hearings. Instead of showing a browbeaten rival meekly accepting allegations of corruption and abuse of power, the transcripts revealed Mr Bo in typical feisty form (see them here, in Chinese).”

via Bo Xilai’s trial: Straying from the script | The Economist.

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