Posts tagged ‘Beijing’

26/11/2013

China Takes Away Civil Servants’ Official Cars in Anticorruption Crusade – China Real Time Report – WSJ

The perks of being a civil servant keep dwindling.

As part of new anticorruption regulations announced by China’s cabinet Monday lower-ranking civil servants will no longer be allotted official cars for general use,  excluding vehicles needed for law enforcement or emergency-response services.

A security officer stands next to a Chinese made Hongqi car outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Reuters

The move is one of several Beijing has made in recent years to step up scrutiny of its official fleets. It has previously urged governments to buy Chinese-made brands and earlier this year cracked down on other auto-related perks enjoyed by the country’s leaders, including the military.

Cars no longer needed because of the new rules will be disposed of via a public bidding process or other forms of auctions, the guidelines said. In the future, civil servants will be allowed to select their preferred mode of travel and will be reimbursed under a transportation-allowance system.

UBS Securities estimated the value of auto sales to governments in China at about 120 billion yuan, or roughly $20 billion, a year, which looks set to decline given the ongoing fleet-reform regulations, said Andreas Graef of management-consulting firm A.T. Kearney.

While governments will continue to procure some cars for official use, there will be greater centralization of purchasing procedures for cars and related products and services such as car insurance, maintenance services and gasoline, he said.

via China Takes Away Civil Servants’ Official Cars in Anticorruption Crusade – China Real Time Report – WSJ.

25/11/2013

China to launch two new carbon trading exchanges | Reuters

China will launch two new pilot carbon trading schemes this week in Beijing and Shanghai as it strives to cut soaring rates of greenhouse gas, reduce choking smog and determine the best system for a nationwide roll-out.

China, the world\’s biggest source of climate-changing carbon emissions, is under domestic pressure from its population to counter air pollution and has pledged to cut the 2005 rate of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP growth by 40-45 percent by 2020.

As U.N.-led climate talks stumbled in Warsaw last week, the country\’s chief negotiator Xie Zhenhua was keen to push the country\’s CO2 cutting credentials, challenging developed nations to match the efforts being made by China to tackle global warming.

The new platforms, which will force industrial firms to buy credits to cover any CO2 they emit above allocated quotas, also underscore Beijing\’s commitment to \”market mechanisms\” to slow emissions growth, in line with an ambitious raft of reforms outlined earlier this month.

\”It is definitely a move in the right direction, but there are concerns about activity — these are pilot schemes and are used as a learning experience, and local governments might not be particularly concerned by volumes,\” said Shawn He, a climate lawyer with the Hualian legal practice in Beijing.

Trading is likely to start slowly as the government treads cautiously and tries to learn lessons from Europe, where an excess of credits has left carbon prices in the doldrums.

Hualian\’s He said there were concerns how effective the pilot schemes would be, as no binding carbon caps would be imposed on enterprises and there were no legal means of forcing them to participate.

via China to launch two new carbon trading exchanges | Reuters.

24/11/2013

Between a desert and a dry place: Beijing’s green projects drain scarce water resources | South China Morning Post

Smog-plagued Beijing is anxiously awaiting its first batch of synthetic natural gas – a material converted from coal and piped 300 kilometres from Heshigten Banner in northeastern Inner Mongolia.

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The gas will power some of Beijing\’s central heating systems in the harsh winter months, replacing coal to cut harmful emissions of particulate pollutants.

When the pipes are fully pumping next year, Beijing will receive 4 billion cubic metres of synthetic gas a year – nearly half of last year\’s natural gas consumption – a step towards switching all the city\’s heating systems and industrial boilers from coal to gas.

But there is an ominous tinge to the seemingly green investment: environmental experts say the water-intensive conversion process could drain already scarce water resources in the country\’s drylands in the northwest, eroding land and causing more sandstorms.

\”If water depletion continues … not only will the local people suffer, the environmental impact could be profound,\” Chinese Academy of Sciences ecology researcher Xie Yan says.

Nationwide, replacing dirty coal with cleaner natural gas is a key measure in reducing the choking smog that spreads over more than a quarter of the country and is inhaled by nearly 600 million people. Because of the country\’s limited conventional natural gas and abundant coal reserves, converting coal to natural gas seems a convenient choice.

Beijing\’s demand for natural gas is expected to rise rapidly, reaching 18 billion tonnes in 2015 and 28 billion tonnes in 2020, as all its heating systems and industrial boilers make the switch from coal to gas. Beijing Gas Group, which is fully owned by the municipal government, has invested in the coal-to-gas project in Inner Mongolia to meet the demand.

The coal-to-gas industry, which had been sputtering for several years, received a boost in September when the State Council released a national action plan to fight air pollution, giving the sector explicit support.

But ecological experts have voiced concern for the unintended environmental consequence of coal-to-gas plants. The conversion requires vast quantities of water not just for production, but also for cooling and the removal of contaminants. On average, one cubic metre of synthetic natural gas needs six to 10 tonnes of freshwater.

\”Freshwater is a key raw material for turning coal to gas, so it\’s impossible to reduce water demand in such projects,\” Wen Hua, an associate at the US-based World Resources Institute (WRI), says.

To make things worse, the coal-abundant northwest, where the gas projects are based, already experiences chronic water shortages. Five provinces – Shanxi , Shaanxi , Ningxia , Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang – which possess 76 per cent of the country\’s coal reserves, have just 6.14 per cent of its total water resources.

via Between a desert and a dry place: Beijing’s green projects drain scarce water resources | South China Morning Post.

23/11/2013

Property in China: Haunted housing | The Economist

IN CHINA, property prices can keep going up forever. At least, that is what optimists seem to think. They point out that the country is undergoing the largest urbanisation in history. The throngs of migrants from the countryside all need homes, the argument runs. China’s swelling middle classes, many of whom live in shoddy 1980s housing, are also eagerly moving to fancier flats or McMansions. The result has been a spectacular property boom over the past decade.

At first glance, it seems the good times are still rolling (see chart). During the first three quarters of this year residential sales shot up by 35% versus the same period a year ago. Prices for new homes rose year-on-year in September in 69 of the 70 biggest cities. In Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing prices jumped by more than 20%; in slightly smaller cities, such as Nanjing and Xiamen, they rose by around 15%.

Despite these signs of rude health, even some of China’s biggest property moguls appear to be growing uneasy. Wang Shi, the chairman of China Vanke, the country’s largest residential-property firm by volume, has called the market a bubble. Wang Jianlin, the country’s richest man and the chairman of Dalian Wanda, a property giant turned entertainment firm, acknowledges that parts of the country may be experiencing a property bubble, though he thinks it “controllable”. Li Ka-Shing, a Hong Kong tycoon who has long been bullish on China, has started to sell his mainland holdings.

The problem is not the wealthiest cities with the most vertiginous valuations. Indeed, in those markets prices may yet go higher. People from all over China buy trophy apartments in Shanghai and Beijing, making their markets as resilient as those of Manhattan and central London. In fact, policies aimed at squelching speculation may be artificially suppressing demand in those places.

Shanghai and Shenzhen recently followed Beijing’s lead by requiring that buyers of second homes put up 70% of the purchase price as a deposit. In Beijing, the sale of a second home incurs a 20% capital-gains tax. (This is supposedly a nationwide policy, but is not always enforced in other cities.) Couples with two homes are reportedly divorcing to avoid the tax, since once officially single they can each own a primary residence, and thus sell either one without penalty.

Demand does not look so robust, however, in places like Yingkou Coastal Industrial Base, in north-eastern China. This development was promoted by the local government as a future hub of economic activity, but the future has not yet arrived. There are rows of empty buildings and few people on the streets. Property salesmen claim that big companies ranging from Coca-Cola to PetroChina are building factories nearby. But even Xinhua, an official media outlet, is sceptical: except for street lamps and the occasional passing vehicle, it reported recently, “at night the base was completely dark.”

Many property developments outside the big cities appear to be ghost towns of this sort. Moody’s, a credit-rating agency, laments that a large and rising share of new supply has gone to smaller cities. People’s Daily, another official organ, recently fulminated against the “huge waste of resources” such construction represents. Nonetheless, by the government’s count, 144 cities in 12 provinces are planning 200 new towns.

via Property in China: Haunted housing | The Economist.

23/11/2013

Japan’s Abe Seeks Asia Alliances to Counter China – Businessweek

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe is the first Japanese premier to visit all 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In late November, Emperor Akihito will make the first visit by a Japanese monarch to India. Not on either dignitary’s itinerary—China. And that’s no accident.

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Abe, a foreign-policy hawk who’s clashed with the Chinese over the ownership of some Japanese-controlled islands, wants to shore up relations with the swath of nations forming a semicircle around China. Some have their own beefs, including India, which shares a disputed border with China. Abe will visit India next year, and in mid-December will host Asean leaders. It’s all part of his campaign to thwart China’s rulers, who, as he wrote in a column last December, see the South China Sea as “Lake Beijing.”

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This is powerful but dangerous talk. China is throwing its considerable weight around more in the region, and it may react aggressively if its neighbors push back too hard. As all sides buy more warships, missiles, and fighter jets, such confrontations could escalate. “Nobody has said this is surrounding China,” says Chiaki Akimoto, director of RUSI Japan, an arm of Britain’s Royal United Services Institute, a think tank. What Abe wants “is just a friendship network with nations around China.”

via Japan’s Abe Seeks Asia Alliances to Counter China – Businessweek.

22/11/2013

China: Labour camp system abolished forever

21/11/2013

Pan-Asian history textbooks struggle to find common language – FT.com

For decades, disagreements over regional history have been a blight on diplomacy between Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul.

Now, South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye has revived a proposal aimed at soothing the long-running row over the region’s history: a shared syllabus of northeast Asian history, to be used as the basis for teaching in all three countries.

Yet while academics view the idea as desirable in principle, most also dismiss it as unfeasible for the foreseeable future – reflecting a continuing deterioration in regional relations, with festering historical grudges at the core.

Japanese school history books have long been seen by South Korean and Chinese critics as emblematic of efforts to downplay atrocities during Japan’s imperial expansion. Politicians in Seoul complain of a failure to address the wartime sexual enslavement of thousands of Korean women, while Beijing has railed at suggestions that Japan occupied Manchuria in response to Chinese provocations.

The historical grievances have intensified since the election last year of the nationalist prime minister Shinzo Abe, whose provocative remarks have included questioning the notion that Japan truly “invaded” Asian countries such as China and Korea.

In her proposal for a shared history syllabus, unveiled at a conference last week in Seoul, Ms Park cited precedents set by Germany, France and Poland. “We may see the removal of the wall of historical problems, which is the seed of conflict and distrust,” she said.

Japanese education minister Hakubun Shimomura – widely seen as one of Mr Abe’s more rightwing cabinet members – said he “openly welcomed” the suggestion. He added that he hoped it could serve as a catalyst for high-level talks between the three governments, something Mr Abe’s administration has been seeking with little success. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman was more cautious, stressing the need for Japan to “adjust its attitude and gain the trust of its Asian neighbours”.

Ms Park’s spokeswoman presents the proposal as part of her drive for a “northeast Asian peace and co-operation initiative” – but in fact politicians and scholars from the three countries have been toying with this idea for years.

In 1997, Seoul and Tokyo agreed to set up a joint committee of historians whose research could form the basis for educational texts – but the body’s work over the ensuing years “just confirmed how deep are the differences between the historical views of the two peoples”, says Lee Gil-sang, a professor at the Academy of Korean Studies in Seoul.

After four years of work, a 2010 report by a similar Sino-Japanese body exposed a rift over Japan’s historical claim to the Okinawa island group – a debate with implications for the countries’ fierce dispute over the Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyu in China.

“It is urgent and necessary to have [a joint history] book considering the growing territorial disputes,” says Su Zhiliang, a professor at Shanghai Normal University who edits Chinese history textbooks.

While officially sponsored efforts have made limited headway, private initiatives have borne more fruit. A group of Chinese, Japanese and South Korean historians jointly produced a history book in 2007, and a second such project was published in all three countries last year. Yet neither text was embraced by any of the three countries’ school authorities.

“The main focus of history teaching in this region is to promote patriotism,” says Mr Lee.

via Pan-Asian history textbooks struggle to find common language – FT.com.

21/11/2013

After Stingy Aid to Typhoon Haiyan Victims, China Tries Damage Control – Businessweek

With a relief team finally on its way to the Philippines, China is trying to control the damage from its petty response to the Typhoon Haiyan tragedy.

A 17-member disaster relief team from the China Red Cross prepares to depart for the Philippines, in Beijing, on Nov. 20

The Chinese group is getting there late because of political differences between the two governments. The storm may have killed thousands of people and brought to a halt a large swath of China’s neighbor to the south, but since the world’s new economic giant is feuding with the Philippines about disputed islands in the South China Sea, the leadership in Beijing decided to take advantage of a humanitarian catastrophe to teach President Benigno Aquino who’s boss.

China initially offered a paltry $100,000 in aid and, after an international outcry, raised that figure to $1.6 million. It’s as if Dr. Evil decided to go into the disaster-relief business: “One point six million dollars!” Hence the headlines worldwide expressing outrage that China, the world’s second-largest economy, was offering less money than do-it-yourself furniture maker Ikea.

Not the ideal message for a country trying to persuade its neighbors of its trustworthiness. China’s ham-fisted response to Haiyan is a welcome gift for Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe, who has spent much of his first year in office touring countries in the region that have good reason to worry about China’s intentions.

That’s probably why China’s officials and media are trying to change the narrative. Chinese relief workers are on their way to the Philippines now, China’s Foreign Ministry announced today—a week and a half after Haiyan hit. But not to worry, some Chinese blankets and tents started arriving on Monday and Tuesday. “China will also send a medical boat Peace Ark, which belongs to the Chinese navy, to the Philippines,” the Xinhua news agency reported today. “The boat, which has good medical rescue capability and maneuverability, will depart soon.”

Even as the Chinese relief effort finally gets underway, there’s a new message: China is actually the victim here, hurt by Philippine bureaucrats. According to Xinhua, China was slow because the Philippine government hadn’t given its blessing. Indeed, the state-run news agency reported yesterday the emergency medical team was “ready to go” and would “depart for the disaster areas immediately, once China gets permission from the Philippines.”

via After Stingy Aid to Typhoon Haiyan Victims, China Tries Damage Control – Businessweek.

21/11/2013

Paranoia from Soviet Union collapse haunts China’s Communist Party

20/11/2013

The party plenum: Everybody who loves Mr Xi, say yes | The Economist

COMMUNIST Party plenums are rituals of unchanging arcana. The closed-door, four-day conclave of some 370 senior party leaders that ended in Beijing on November 12th was a typical example, as usual summing up its decisions in a gnomic communiqué full of ambiguities. Yet a parsing of the document suggests President Xi Jinping (pictured above, centre) is tightening his grip on power, and with it his ability to achieve breakthroughs in economic and social reforms.

China’s state-controlled media have hailed the meeting, known as the third plenum of the 18th Central Committee, as “a new historical starting point”. Global Times, an English-language newspaper, said it was just as important as the most famous plenum in the party’s history, which brought Deng Xiaoping to power in 1978 and ushered in profound changes that turned China into the world’s second-largest economy. There is little in the communiqué to back such bullish assertions, but the summary of the proceedings offers hope that the pace of reform will pick up.

For the first time in such a document, the party has called for markets to play a “decisive” role in the allocation of resources. This has been glossed by official media as a step up from previous party language that described the role of market forces as merely “basic”. This new language, according to an academic quoted by Global Times, aroused much debate during preparations for the plenum. Semantics can be very important. The party’s decision in 1992 to create a “socialist market economy”, not just a socialist one, caused an upsurge of reformist zeal, including the privatisation or closure of tens of thousands of state-owned enterprises, as well as market-opening measures that paved the way for accession to the World Trade Organisation a decade later.

As expected, this week’s communiqué contained few indications of specific new policies. These will become clearer in a few days or weeks when the resolution is published, and after senior economic officials meet in December to decide on the country’s economic strategy for the year ahead. There was no mention of financial reforms to allow market forces to determine interest and exchange rates, which many economists view as crucial. On rural land reform, also closely watched, the document merely repeated language introduced at a plenum five years ago about the need to unify urban and rural property markets. Despite its reassuring words about the role of the market, it said the state sector should remain the “main body” of the economy, an odd concept, especially since China’s GDP is now largely generated by the private sector.

But at party plenums, repetition of familiar language is not necessarily a sign of inertia. The meeting in 1978 was laden with Mao-era rhetoric, but led to the ditching of Mao’s economic policies. More important were the signals it sent about Deng’s grip on power, including the return to central roles of many of Deng’s allies who had been purged by Mao. The just-concluded plenum announced two institutional changes that suggest Mr Xi has moved fast to consolidate his position.

The first of these is the setting up of a “state-security committee”. Details of this have not been revealed. It may be Mr Xi’s attempt to rein in a security apparatus that had become too powerful in recent years. Some of its functions are expected to mirror those of America’s National Security Council, which advises the president on foreign policy and tries to ensure that all government agencies are well co-ordinated. China’s new body is thought likely to include representatives from the army and police as well as ministries responsible for foreign and economic affairs. It would be a sign of Mr Xi’s growing power if he has at last persuaded the security forces to act more in concert with the rest of the bureaucracy.

The other notable change is the establishment of a “leading small group” to supervise reforms. Such groups count. They report to the Politburo and help to form and implement policy decisions. Again, no details have been given of the new body, but it could help to overcome bureaucratic rivalries that often stymie reforms. It may even be chaired by Mr Xi. The communiqué calls for “decisive results” by 2020 in unspecified “important areas” of reform.

Not surprisingly, given a fierce crackdown on political dissent in recent months, the document said little about political reform (although for the first time in the history of party plenums, Chinese television indulged in a show of glasnost by broadcasting scenes of group discussions, though participants’ voices could not be heard). The communiqué favourably mentions democracy 12 times, but plenum-watchers learned long ago that this particular count is best ignored.

via The party plenum: Everybody who loves Mr Xi, say yes | The Economist.

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