Posts tagged ‘Senkaku Islands’

13/01/2015

Japan, China hold maritime crisis talks in Tokyo – Xinhua | English.news.cn

Japan and China hold the fourth round of talks in Tokyo on maritime crisis management mechanism Monday, with both countries agreeing to launch it as soon as possible once a broad agreement is reached.

The working-level talks, participated by officials from Japan’ s Defense Ministry and the Maritime Self-Defense Force and China’ s Defense Ministry, firstly reaffirmed basic agreements they have made so far.

The two sides also discussed some specifics of the mechanism, including technical problems, and agreed to trigger it as soon as possible after some necessary adjustments based on Monday’s talks, Chinese officials said.

The mechanism of high-level consultations on maritime affairs between the two countries was launched in 2012. After three rounds of successful talks, the talks were suspended after the Japanese government‘s so-called”nationalization”of China’s Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea in September 2012.

via Japan, China hold maritime crisis talks in Tokyo – Xinhua | English.news.cn.

19/11/2014

China and Japan: Out of the deep freeze | The Economist

AFTER Japan’s prime minister worshipped at Tokyo’s Yasukuni shrine last December, China declared Shinzo Abe to be beyond the pale; principles are principles. But Chinese ones are, well, nothing if not adaptable, and on November 10th President Xi Jinping met Mr Abe for the first time. A “four-point agreement” comes as a welcome signal that tensions between Asia’s two biggest powers might, at least for now, begin to ease.

The thorn in the side of relations is Japan’s Senkaku islands, which China claims and calls the Diaoyus. Chinese aircraft and coastguard vessels have greatly raised tensions from 2012 onwards, by making incursions around the Senkakus. So it is progress that Japan and China now acknowledge “the emergence of tense situations” there. For the first time Japan has referred to the Senkakus in a document with China. Chinese analysts claim a diplomatic victory. Even if obliquely, Japan acknowledges a dispute over sovereignty, Huang Dahui of Renmin University argues. Yet the wording also left ample room for Japanese diplomats to insist that they have not acknowledged any such thing.

The negotiations seem mostly about avoiding the hard issues. On Yasukuni, it beggars belief to think the Japanese promised Mr Abe would not visit the shrine where high-ranking war criminals are honoured. The joint statement says that Japan and China will overcome “political difficulties” in the spirit of “squarely facing history” (a favourite Communist Party phrase). China believes that means Mr Abe will stay away. Mr Abe and his right-wing supporters may think differently.

Most welcome is a commitment to set up crisis-management mechanisms in the crowded seas and skies around the Senkakus. For months both sides’ armed forces have seen the need for such a step, says Noboru Yamaguchi, a retired Japanese general. Yet the details remain unclear.

Now the two countries’ ministries can resume their connections, though exchanges are likely to remain fraught. As if to underscore the challenges, this week Mr Abe brought up with Mr Xi a fresh diplomatic complaint, about Chinese coral poachers hunting near Japan’s distant Ogasawara islands. As for the Senkaku islands and waters, will China withdraw incursions by its coastguard cutters? That would be the most genuine proof of a Chinese desire to lower the temperature.

via China and Japan: Out of the deep freeze | The Economist.

07/11/2014

Foreign policy: Showing off to the world | The Economist

THE factories have closed down for a few days, and millions of cars have been ordered off the roads. Clear blue skies appearing over a usually smog-choked Beijing always mean one thing: a big event is about to get under way.

From November 10th President Xi Jinping will welcome world leaders to this year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summit. Not since the Olympics in 2008 have so many leaders gathered in the capital, and they will include the heads of the United States, Russia and Japan. It is a defining moment for Mr Xi’s foreign policy. Having established himself at home as China’s most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping, he now seems to want to demand a bigger, more dominant and more respected role for China than his predecessors, Deng included, ever dared ask for.

Respect begins by putting on a good face to guests. Chinese bullying over disputed maritime claims has done much to raise tensions in the region. But now Mr Xi appears to be lowering them. In particular, China’s relations with Japan have been abysmal. The government has treated Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, with both venom and pettiness, implying he is a closet militarist. The relationship had sunk to such a low that it will count as notable progress if Mr Xi shakes Mr Abe’s hand—even if he does little more—at the summit.

On November 11th and 12th, Mr Xi will host a state visit in Beijing for Barack Obama. It is the second summit with the American president, following one at Sunnylands in California in 2013. It will be a good show, with a scenic walk and all that. But the substance appears less clear. At the time of Sunnylands, there was much Chinese talk of a “new type of great-power relationship” with America. Yet since it implies a diminished role for America, at least in Asia, Mr Obama does not seem inclined to go along. The two men appear likely to co-operate in a few areas, including climate change, trade and investment. They will agree to a bit more communication over respective military movements in and over the seas near China. But hopes that cordiality at Sunnylands might lead the relationship to blossom may come to little.

In truth, Mr Xi does not have much respect left for Mr Obama; the Chinese dismiss him as weak-willed in foreign policy. And so much of Mr Xi’s ambition lies elsewhere. Above all, the dream is to return China to its rightful place in a world in which, according to Bonnie Glaser of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think-tank, “China will be at the centre, and every other nation will have to consider China’s interests.”

This attitude is most familiar to China’s neighbours in the South China Sea and East China Sea. China has upset the Philippines by grabbing a disputed reef; Vietnam, by moving an oil rig into contested waters; Japan, by challenging its control over uninhabited islets; and even South Korea which, though on good terms, was concerned along with others when China declared an “Air Defence Identification Zone” over the East China Sea, demanding that planes inform it when entering it.

Yet Mr Xi has also courted friends under the catchphrase of “peaceful development”. He has pushed multilateral initiatives, including a new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which many of China’s neighbours, including India, have signed up to. A New Development Bank has also been set up with fellow “BRICs”—Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa.

One of Mr Xi’s playmates is President Vladimir Putin. China and Russia have a history of mutual distrust, but Mr Xi’s first trip abroad as president, in March 2013, was to Moscow. Since then the two countries have struck a long-stalled gas deal and, according to Kommersant, a Russian newspaper, a pact on cyber-security. China backs Russia’s pro-Syrian stand in the UN Security Council and has refused to condemn Russia’s territorial incursions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine—though it loves to preach non-interference.

A strong thread that binds the two countries is American dominance in international affairs. “No country”, said Mr Xi at a security summit earlier this year to which Mr Putin was invited, “should attempt to dominate regional security affairs or infringe upon the legitimate rights…of other countries.” Mr Xi did not name America, but a month earlier Mr Obama had in Tokyo emphasised that America’s security pact with Japan extended to the Japan-controlled Senkaku islands, which China claims and calls the Diaoyu.

Is Mr Xi’s foreign policy succeeding? Only in parts. China’s maritime assertiveness has pushed some neighbours closer to Japan and America. But for long China will remain Asian nations’ biggest trading partner. It is busy pursuing regional and bilateral trade agreements while an American-led trade initiative, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, is bogged down. At APEC Mr Xi will seek to build on those economic relationships. And, given China’s heft, by and large he will succeed.

via Foreign policy: Showing off to the world | The Economist.

17/07/2014

With Tensions Rising, Japanese Investment in China Plummets – Businessweek

Another consequence of the worsening Sino-Japanese relations: Japanese investment into China dropped by nearly half in the first six month of 2014, according to a new report by China’s Ministry of Commerce. As recently a 2012, Japanese investment posted growth of 16.3 percent, reaching $7.28 billion. The decline actually started last year, with a 4.3 percent drop.

Zhang Jifeng, director of the Japanese economy department in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the China Daily that Japan’s entrepreneurs are “waiting and watching.” He added: ”They’re profoundly aware of the connection between the political climate and their commercial performance [in China]. They don’t want to put their assets at risk.”

English: Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.

English: Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

China and Japan are in a dispute over the ownership of the uninhabited Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe further angered Beijing in December when he visited Tokyo’s Yasukuni shrine, a temple that honors Japanese soldiers but also its war criminals. Earlier this month Japan’s cabinet passed a resolution reinterpreting its pacifist constitution so its military can defend its allies.

via With Tensions Rising, Japanese Investment in China Plummets – Businessweek.

22/02/2014

China gives order to commence war with Japan ‘if it is appropriate to fight’

This translated article seems to confirm the views of a senior US military person – https://chindia-alert.org/2014/02/20/china-training-for-short-sharp-war-says-senior-us-naval-officer-ft-com/

China has been to war with India, Russia and Vietnam over border/territorial disputes – https://chindia-alert.org/political-factors/chinese-tensions/ – Perhaps this will be another such conflict.

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05/01/2014

* China says its massive navy buildup is world’s biggest

China is no 2 to US in economic terms. Soon (if not already) it will be no 2 in military terms as well.

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09/12/2013

Guest post: Senkaku – accelerating the China relocation trade? | beyondbrics

The debate continues on the motivations and risks of China’s decision on November 23 to announce an East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) which critically includes the disputed Senkaku Islands (know in China as Daioyu). There is little dispute that the standoff between China, Japan and the US has the capacity to escalate into something much more dangerous unless US Vice-President Joe Biden’s recent Asia trip is effective in ratcheting down tensions.

Has China miscalculated in terms of the rapid US response of B52 bomber sorties over the disputed Islands or prospective US naval deployment build-up in the region? Or is this the preliminary phase of a much longer-term slow creep by China in fulfilling its ambitions in establishing a more dominant regional role? Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei (all US allies) are – like Japan – enmeshed in arguments with Beijing over relatively minor but potentially strategic bits of maritime real estate. Does the US administration have the willingness to back its allies on all fronts

Others have argued that the new Chinese leadership under President Xi Jinping are using nationalist sentiment to distract the Chinese public from the growth slowdown as well as solidify support among the Chinese military. Meanwhile Japan has been busily building up mutual defence and security ties across southeast Asia, and with Australia and India, as a hedge against Beijing. The state visit of the Japanese Emperor to India to has taken on even more significance.

While the geopolitical dynamics remain fluid and uncertain, a more definite consequence of the dispute may well be to accelerate the China relocation macro theme with major implications for FDI flows in the rest of the region. Up until now the primary motivation for foreign companies with large scale manufacturing operations to relocate from China has been the rapid rise in Chinese labour costs and the growing signs of worker shortages. The case was made most effectively by former World Bank Chief Economist Justin Yifu Lin (see Chandra, Lin and Wang (2012)) who suggested that:

industrial upgrading has increased wages and is causing China to graduate from labor-intensive to more capital-and technology-intensive industries. These industries will shed labor and create a huge opportunity for lower wage countries to start a phase of labor-intensive industrialization.

This process, which they called the Leading Dragon Phenomenon, offers an unprecedented opportunity to low-income countries where the industrial sector is underdeveloped and investment capital and entrepreneurial skills are leading constraints to manufacturing. They also note that low income countries such can seize the opportunity and resolve the constraints by attracting some of the FDI flowing currently from China, India and Brazil into the manufacturing sectors of other developing countries.

So the relocation of factories as a result of China economic rebalancing is a multi-year structural trend that is likely to be the dominant macro theme for developing economies for the next decade and beyond. But it is becoming more apparent that political risk mitigation in the face of resurgent Chinese regional territorial ambitions and aggressiveness will re-inforce the macroeconomic justification for diversifying away from China. Japanese outward FDI has increased for two years in succession, with 2012 the second highest increase in history ($122.4bn, an increase of 12.5 per cent over the previous year). Japan’s total outward FDI stock exceeded $1tn. However what is more interesting, as illustrated in the diagram below, is that Japan’s FDI flow to ASEAN has grown relative to that towards China.

Even if it’s a remote scenario, what if accidental engagement between Japanese and Chinese fighters in the newly announced ADIZ rapidly escalated into a more serious conflict or even declaration of war? The hundreds of billions of dollars of Japanese investment into factories in China would appear at risk. Even if we exclude the expropriation of factories directly, at the very minimum, the experience of Chinese nationalist protests over the Yasukune shrine visits by Japanese politicians or in the more distant past the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade are clearly risks that policy makers and boards of Japanese multinationals must be increasingly worried about. And, unlike Chinese holdings of US treasuries that could be liquidated reasonably quickly, albeit potentially at the risk of self-destructively causing a meltdown in global financial markets, FDI in factory assets is, by its very nature, immobile. Moreover Japanese managers and workers in China would also be vulnerable. One might argue that there is a risk of a similar level of concern developing in Seoul or Taipei or perhaps even Washington.

via Guest post: Senkaku – accelerating the China relocation trade? | beyondbrics.

Ifty Islam is the managing partner of AT Capital in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Ifty.islam@ at-capital.com

21/11/2013

Pan-Asian history textbooks struggle to find common language – FT.com

For decades, disagreements over regional history have been a blight on diplomacy between Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul.

Now, South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye has revived a proposal aimed at soothing the long-running row over the region’s history: a shared syllabus of northeast Asian history, to be used as the basis for teaching in all three countries.

Yet while academics view the idea as desirable in principle, most also dismiss it as unfeasible for the foreseeable future – reflecting a continuing deterioration in regional relations, with festering historical grudges at the core.

Japanese school history books have long been seen by South Korean and Chinese critics as emblematic of efforts to downplay atrocities during Japan’s imperial expansion. Politicians in Seoul complain of a failure to address the wartime sexual enslavement of thousands of Korean women, while Beijing has railed at suggestions that Japan occupied Manchuria in response to Chinese provocations.

The historical grievances have intensified since the election last year of the nationalist prime minister Shinzo Abe, whose provocative remarks have included questioning the notion that Japan truly “invaded” Asian countries such as China and Korea.

In her proposal for a shared history syllabus, unveiled at a conference last week in Seoul, Ms Park cited precedents set by Germany, France and Poland. “We may see the removal of the wall of historical problems, which is the seed of conflict and distrust,” she said.

Japanese education minister Hakubun Shimomura – widely seen as one of Mr Abe’s more rightwing cabinet members – said he “openly welcomed” the suggestion. He added that he hoped it could serve as a catalyst for high-level talks between the three governments, something Mr Abe’s administration has been seeking with little success. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman was more cautious, stressing the need for Japan to “adjust its attitude and gain the trust of its Asian neighbours”.

Ms Park’s spokeswoman presents the proposal as part of her drive for a “northeast Asian peace and co-operation initiative” – but in fact politicians and scholars from the three countries have been toying with this idea for years.

In 1997, Seoul and Tokyo agreed to set up a joint committee of historians whose research could form the basis for educational texts – but the body’s work over the ensuing years “just confirmed how deep are the differences between the historical views of the two peoples”, says Lee Gil-sang, a professor at the Academy of Korean Studies in Seoul.

After four years of work, a 2010 report by a similar Sino-Japanese body exposed a rift over Japan’s historical claim to the Okinawa island group – a debate with implications for the countries’ fierce dispute over the Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyu in China.

“It is urgent and necessary to have [a joint history] book considering the growing territorial disputes,” says Su Zhiliang, a professor at Shanghai Normal University who edits Chinese history textbooks.

While officially sponsored efforts have made limited headway, private initiatives have borne more fruit. A group of Chinese, Japanese and South Korean historians jointly produced a history book in 2007, and a second such project was published in all three countries last year. Yet neither text was embraced by any of the three countries’ school authorities.

“The main focus of history teaching in this region is to promote patriotism,” says Mr Lee.

via Pan-Asian history textbooks struggle to find common language – FT.com.

19/11/2013

How U.S. and China may administer the “Six Wars”

Hope the scenarios do not actually play out as predicted by The Inndian Defence Review.  See – https://chindia-alert.org/2013/10/20/six-wars-china-is-sure-to-fight-in-the-next-50-years-stratrisks/

06/11/2013

Japan targets China as islands dispute threatens to boil over

Oh dear, brinkmanship often turns out to trigger real conflict. Hope this one doesn’t.

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