- China Reconnects: Joining a Deep-rooted Past to a New World Order looks at how the Middle Kingdom is trying to build a modern civilisation without forgetting its heritage
China Reconnects: Joining a Deep-rooted Past to a New World Order is a new book by Australian historian Wang Gungwu. The book seeks to explain the new-found confidence among the Chinese in their capacity to learn all they need from the developed world while retaining enough from their past to build a modern civilisation. It does not employ theoretical frameworks to explain China’s rise, as Wang believes they are not appropriate to describe the changes sweeping the country. He calls for greater understanding of why history is particularly important to the Chinese state and its people, as the nation seeks the means to respond to a United States trying to preserve its dominant position in the international status quo.
Wang is university professor at the National University of Singapore and professor emeritus of the Australian National University. The book is published by World Scientific Publishing. Here are some excerpts.
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
Xi Jinping also inherited programmes from his predecessors “theories” like sange daibiao (Three Represents) and hexie shehuizhuyi shehui (Harmonious socialist society).
Given the pervasive corruption that he found in high places, he must have wondered how useful these theories were. The former was implicitly socialist, stressing productive forces, advanced culture and concern for the interests of the majority. The latter, however, was redolent of Confucian values, made even more explicit when Hu Jintao spoke of barong bachi, or “eight honours and eight disgraces”. Despite these exhortations, the corruption that accompanied them reminds us of conditions familiar to Chinese dynasties in decline.
If the regime’s Chinese characteristics enabled officials to be corrupt and the rich to become excessively rich and selfish, where was the socialism? While no one would claim that everything in China’s past was desirable, surely there were better features that could have been chosen to inspire the present. Perhaps not all the corruption should be blamed on old feudal China; the open market economy with its capitalist characteristics is also known for creating the huge gap today between the super rich and the rest. If the capitalist mode is undermining socialist good intentions, are there Chinese characteristics that can protect China from that infection?
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Critics have been quick to attack as well as defend Confucian China and the market and no simple answer has been found. What Xi Jinping inherited was a collective leadership system that failed to police the Party. He thus reacted by asserting that the Party was in grave danger of collapse. The foremost patriotic act was to save the party. He has to find the socialism that could induce his comrades to rededicate themselves.
He turned to Karl Marx to emphasise its original inspiration and avoided the Russian duo, Lenin and Stalin. By stressing the importance of Marx’s world view and analytical methods, he could ignore the Soviet institutional baggage. Above all, Marx stood for the idea of progress, the modern import from the Enlightenment that has impressed generations of Chinese.
China’s modern story began by rebuilding a unified state. Those leaning towards socialism further agreed that the country had to have a strong centralised government, perhaps the most enduring feature of dynastic China. Sun Yat-sen had recognised that and wanted to be the leader with power to get things done. When Chiang Kai-shek seized power, he fought with every weapon available to maintain his supreme position. It was therefore not surprising that Mao Zedong thought that the Party leader should have full control. His victory over the Nationalists had put him in an unassailable position.
Thereafter, he could redefine the goals that fit his agenda. He was so successful that socialism in his hands became almost unrecognisable. Deng Xiaoping had a difficult time teaching another generation why socialism was progressive and why infusing it with Chinese characteristics would ensure its legitimacy.
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This was the background to the corrupted China that came so unexpectedly into Xi Jinping’s hands. From his appointment as party secretary in Shanghai to the Politburo Standing Committee and as vice-president, he had five years to prepare to become the leader of the country. Some of what went through his mind during that period may be gleaned from his writings when he served in Zhejiang, in the Zhijiang xinyu that he published in 2007, but more important was what he thought of a collective leadership that was headless.
Xi Jinping obviously believes that his anti-corruption campaign was vital to enable him to save the Party. His campaign also made him popular and he has tied the campaign to a new faith in socialism.
He has emphasised that Deng Xiaoping’s reforms saved the state and the Party and are integral to the power that he has inherited. He had worked dutifully in support of reform and this helped him rise to the highest office. His youthful experiences growing up with the peasants of the northwest taught him about failures as well as successes. That has led him to ask the Party to connect with the first 30 Maoist years as much as study the later years of reform. That way he confirmed the continuity of what he, his father and their comrades had committed their lives to serve. This attitude towards continuities in Chinese history has always looked to a strong state with powerful leaders. Xi Jinping discovered during his years of service what kind of power would be required to establish the caring and fair society that socialism stood for. When he became president, he not only knew that Mao Zedong as cult leader could not succeed but also that a leaderless collective endangered the Party. He has concluded that the Chinese way of doing socialism would have to be connected to the lessons learned throughout the Chinese past.
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Only by recognising how relevant those lessons are can China confidently go forward to devise the modern state that it wants.
There is some truth in the French saying that the more things change the more things remain the same. The Chinese were even more directly paradoxical. They believed that change was inevitable and hence prepared for changes that could occur several times in a lifetime. When thus prepared, they hoped that each change would not destroy the things that were still valued. If the foundations survived, change could make the new become stronger.
There are other ideas in the tradition that Xi Jinping understands. One is that of zhi and xing (knowing and acting) and zhixing heyi (combining knowledge with action). This had been highlighted since the days of Ming philosopher Wang Yangming.
In modern times, Sun Yat-sen advocated xing erhou zhi (act then you will know) as preferable to the safer and more conservative zhi erhou xing (know before acting) and Xi Jinping seems to share that view. When you act and make your choices, these add up so that you will really know. From that perspective, Mao Zedong’s choices taught hard lessons and the Chinese people now know what not to do. Another idea goes back to Confucius, who said shu er buzuo, or transmitting (tradition) and not doing (something new). In other words, without claiming newness or discovery, he transmitted wisdom and knowledge to those who followed. Xi Jinping seems to focus on drawing on past experiences that enable future generations to learn: with learning, something new would result.
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Xi Jinping may not need the word “new” for his socialism. His shehui zhuyi could be the accumulation of layers of modern experience that harmonise with selected bits of China’s history. Explaining the actions and reactions of generations of his predecessors could take his party-state to another level of development. Here a sage Marx symbolically as important as Confucius would add the goal of progress to inherited wisdom. Socialism could be “hard” in rational and disciplined action and “soft” in moral goals deeply rooted in people’s aspirations. A strong leader who knew how to link the past to a dream of the future could shape the socialism that his people could identify as the datong shehui in China’s heritage.
DIFFERENT HERITAGE
The distance between the legal systems in China and the West has long been a matter of regret. It began when Britain was no longer prepared to let Chinese law be used to punish British subjects; that issue became the cause célèbre in the Anglo-Chinese wars.
Despite the fact that China had, with the help of Anglo-American and other European legal scholars, reformed and modernised its legal system during the past 100 years, the gulf has remained and has continued to fuel an underlying lack of trust. This has once again surfaced in contemporary interstate relations wherever the People’s Republic is involved.
The issue had become sensitive when the Western powers made it clear that their legal ideals were meant to cover the relations between civilised states, and China had been found wanting. The divide stemmed from the European assumption that international law was built on a common Christian heritage. The treaties that followed China’s several defeats led to extraterritorial jurisdictions by Western powers and Japan. These humiliated China for being so uncivilised that provisions were necessary for the protection of civilised people. The set of practices that diminished China’s sovereign rights remained a source of anger for 100 years and coloured Chinese attitudes towards all Western reference to the rule of law down to the present.
The different value given by China and the West to the role of law has deep roots. It originated from the different premises made about the relationship between man and nature, between those who moved from believing in many gods to faiths in one God, and those whose world views allowed them to live without reference to any God or gods.
The single-god world emerged in the Mediterranean region (among Jewish, Christian or Islamic believers) while the mixed often-godless realm was developed in the Sinic cultural zone in eastern Asia.
When traced far back, what is significant is that, while there were great differences in conceptions, both godly and godless traditions paid respect to the role of law, albeit each in its own way. There was no question of not depending on law for securing order, especially the controls needed for political order. Whether the laws reached into private and family affairs, or were in the main varieties of civil and criminal law, all those in authority gave much thought to formulating them to bring out what was fair and most efficacious. And both European and Chinese rulers paid close attention to laws pertaining to governance, and specifically to their relations with their subjects.
Where their respective heritage parted significantly was the way their rulers institutionalised their codes. Those in Europe believed that the rule of law was a higher principle that stood above other considerations; it was sanctified by the supernatural and therefore sacrosanct. The idea had grown out of customary law observed by tribal organisations as well as in the royal and canon laws promulgated in princely states or kingdoms. In time, they were extended to cover larger political units like nation states or empires. Law was therefore at the centre of all governance and remained steadfast whether the rulers were strong men or a group of oligarchs, or leaders who were democratically chosen. Whoever they were and wherever they came from, they could only rule through regulations and statutes that were seen as parts of God’s law. Thereafter, that conception of the rule of law led to questions being asked as to what would best serve those who are equal in the eyes of God. That led people to demand that law should protect people from abusive rulers. The key point was that, behind the respect for the law was religious doctrine and the Church. In certain contexts, God’s law had the power to send even the strongest leaders to the fires of hell. When this authority shifted following the Reformation, Christian Europe still maintained that each church embodied the spirit of God’s law.
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When the classics of the Greco-Roman period were given a new lease of life during the Renaissance, this ancient learning stimulated revolts within the Church. The Protestants reinterpreted their heritage and provided conditions whereby new ideas were allowed to grow. As a result, the advent of scepticism, rationalism and the scientific mind enabled an intense questioning of past assumptions that eventually led to a secular view of the world.
Western Europe largely moved away from church-determined ideas and went on to develop laws that have been described as rational and modern. That saw the beginning of a powerful legal system under which the ruler gave up most of his powers so that his subjects would have more say. Of course, who actually had a say was another matter.
It took the British more than 100 years to let ordinary men have the vote, and the women did not get theirs until the 20th century. The British were unapologetic about that pace of development. They thought that the only people who should be allowed to vote were people who owned property and were well-educated. Nevertheless, the principle that people could control their own destiny was confirmed.
In one form or another, laws were obeyed in good conscience by God-fearing people and rational scientific-minded people alike. Even when the laws were obviously man-made and could be cruelly implemented, whether by kings, judges or elected legislators, it continued to be understood that a higher spirit rested behind their making. That belief gave the laws a special moral standing and placed the rule of law at the heart of Western political culture. In short, the ruler was always subject to God’s law.
In comparison, the Chinese have also long acknowledged that laws should be respected but the idea of the rule of law was only implicitly understood. Everyone was conscious that the laws demanded absolute obeisance; that was akin to fear of the ruler’s wrath. Those draconian laws had been given centrality by the state of Qin during the Warring States period. The legalists who drew them up enabled the Qin to defeat the rival states and use the laws to control, dominate and dictate in every respect. What was understood, and sometimes made explicit, was that the ruler would always employ the law to stay in power.
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The idea that rules accompanied by harsh punishments made states strong attracted many of the warring lords from the fifth to the third century BC. It led them to challenge the Zhou dynasty’s claim that good governance came from the model rulers of a legendary Golden Age who embodied the principle that the right to rule had to be defined in moral terms. In that context, legitimacy was confirmed through rituals that demonstrate that the ruler had received the Mandate of Heaven.
The rulers of the state of Qin thought otherwise. They employed legalists who believed that power depended on total control through harsh laws and finally destroyed all rivals to establish a new dynasty. The new emperor made sure everyone knew that he was above the law and his laws must be obeyed.
This law was a revolutionary instrument used to destroy a decrepit ancient regime. However, the legalists were so extreme in their rejection of traditional moral and social norms that people rose in revolt and that enabled the Han dynasty to take over the empire. The Han rulers reformed the emperor-state system and experimented with other ideas.
But they retained the body of Qin laws that guided the centralised bureaucracy and brought in non-legalists to administer the empire.
The fourth emperor, Han Wudi, then entrusted men of Confucian learning to balance the harsh laws with their moral ideals. The writings of Confucius had been torched and banned by the Qin. Now his disciples could practise what they preached.
The Han ideal thereafter was to educate rulers in the Confucian Classics that extolled them to be guided by responsible officials chosen for their learning and moral principles. The legal system was no longer upfront but remained there to be used by Confucian scholars whenever necessary. That set the tone of imperial governance even for the Central Asian tribal successors of the Han during the fifth and sixth centuries.
By the Tang dynasty, Confucian moral wisdom modified the law codes again, and these were further revised during the Ming-Qing dynasties.
In short, laws with deep roots in Confucian renzhi provided the foundations of the empire state for at least 1,500 years. As outlined earlier, God’s law in its secular form came to stand at the heart of the universalism promoted by the West and led by the United States and its European allies since the end of World War Two. In contrast, the idea of what was civilised in China had been particularistic and the laws guiding its modernisation process operate within its own framework.
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The country has been prepared to learn from and even adopt Western law codes, but also wants to reconnect with the moral principles that had protected its heritage. This reminds us that law today has not only been a question of adapting modern law for China’s use but is also the source of tension in Sino-Western relations. The normative use of law extended by the West to apply to all interstate relations continues to provide a challenge. Chinese leaders closely observed how those legal institutions have worked in international relations. In particular, they noted how those institutions could not prevent the two wars that destroyed European supremacy. This has led them to believe that the system is not fair or stable and could be improved.
THE NANYANG CONNECTION
Today a new Southeast Asia can work through Asean. This regional organisation is a remarkable achievement, but it is still work in progress. Beginning with maritime interests, it now includes continental states with very different histories. Vietnam, for example, learnt the same lessons as the Chinese and now looks much more to the sea while Laos is totally landlocked. As for Cambodia and Myanmar, how they respond to maritime challenges is still unclear. As members of Asean, this may matter less as long as they can count on a united organisation to monitor the region’s naval concerns.
Here Asean’s efforts could make it greater than its parts. The region’s location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans ensures that the great maritime powers of the world will always have a strategic interest in its well-being. But there are analogies with the Mediterranean world that may be relevant. Although on a smaller scale, naval power in that sea determined the fates of all the states involved, deep divisions between the states on its northern and southern coasts have lasted to this day. It is never a question of naval power alone. The states facing the sea have strong hinterlands and neither those of the north nor of the south could dominate the Mediterranean for long. That should remind us that Southeast Asia with its continental and maritime members could also be vulnerable to divisions when confronted by external forces coming from different directions and calling on each of its member states to choose sides.
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Another interesting question is why the South China Sea was never a zone of naval conflict the way the Mediterranean was. It is narrower in parts and wider in others and not well sealed like having Gibraltar at one end and Suez at the other. There are more openings to the ocean, as in the Taiwan Strait, the Sunda and Malacca Straits, as well as the passages leading into the South Pacific. In addition, unlike the Mediterranean where there were always powerful states on both sides of the sea, there was no power that could challenge the Chinese empire in the South China Sea. Had there been one, perhaps that sea would also have been a zone of tense and extended competition from ancient times.
That may be about to change. Today, the newly announced Indo-Pacific front has created a counter-power to face a rising China. At the same time, dynamic economic growth is moving from the Atlantic to this extended maritime space. Together, they have given new life to the Old World. Thus countries like China and India are building more credible navies to match those of Japan and the United States. In that way, the Indo-Pacific could serve as a larger Mediterranean in which the South China Sea acts as its strategic centre. That would make the double-ocean zone one of continuous tension in which powerful protagonists will keep the divisions permanent.
If Asean is divided underneath that overarching framework, it would be of little use to anybody. The region’s history renders it open to divisions, especially between the mainland and the archipelagic states that tend to look in different directions for their well-being. However, if these states can overcome their historical baggage, Asean could have a major role to play in the midst of the rapid changes in the relations between the New Global and Old World. If it is united on critical issues, it could provide a bridge that helps to make those relationships peaceful and constructive. That would not only help its members withstand the pressures put on them, but also demonstrate to all major powers that their interests are also best served by a truly united Asean.
Source: SCMP
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