Chindia Alert: You’ll be Living in their World Very Soon
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Embassy in France removes ‘false image’ on Twitter in latest online controversy amid accusations of spreading disinformation
After months of aggressive anti-US posts by Chinese diplomats Beijing is cracking down on ‘smear campaigns’ at home
Beijing’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy has coincided with a rise of nationalist content on Chinese social media. Photo: Reuters
Beijing is battling allegations that it is running a disinformation campaign on social media, as robust posts by its diplomats in Western countries promoting nationalist sentiment have escalated into a spat between China and other countries, especially the United States.
In the latest in a series of online controversies, the Chinese embassy in France claimed its official Twitter account had been hacked after it featured a cartoon depicting the US as Death, knocking on a door marked Hong Kong after leaving a trail of blood outside doors marked Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Venezuela. The inclusion in the image of a Star of David on the scythe also prompted accusations of anti-Semitism.
Top China diplomats call for ‘Wolf Warrior’ army in foreign relations
25 May 2020
“Someone posted a false image on our official Twitter account by posting a cartoon entitled ‘Who is Next?’. The embassy would like to condemn it and always abides by the principles of truthfulness, objectivity and rationality of information,” it said on Monday.
The rise of China’s aggressive “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy has been regarded by analysts as primarily aimed at building support for the government at home but the latest incident is seen as an attempt by Beijing to take back control of the nationalist narrative it has unleashed.
Florian Schneider, director of the Leiden Asia Centre in the Netherlands, said the removal of the embassy’s tweet reflected a constant concern in Beijing about the range of people – including ordinary citizens – who were involved in spreading nationalistic material online.
“The state insists that its nationalism is ‘rational’, meaning it is meant to inspire domestic unity through patriotism but without impacting national interests or endangering social stability,” he said.
“This makes nationalism a mixed blessing for the authorities … if nationalist stories demonise the US or Japan or some other potential enemy, then any Chinese leader dealing diplomatically with those perceived enemies ends up looking weak.
“Trying to guide nationalist sentiment in ways that further the leadership’s interests is a difficult balancing act and I suspect this is partly the reason why the authorities are currently trying to clamp down on unauthorised, nationalist conspiracy theories.”
Too soon: Chinese advisers tell ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomats to tone it down
The report came after months of social media posts – including by Chinese diplomats – defending China against accusations it had mishandled the coronavirus pandemic and attacking the US and other perceived enemies.
In March, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian promoted a conspiracy theory on Twitter suggesting the virus had originated in the US and was brought to China by the US Army. His comments were later downplayed, with China’s ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai saying questions about the origin of the virus should be answered by scientists.
Schneider said this showed that the state-backed nationalistic propaganda online was at risk of backfiring diplomatically.
“The authorities have to constantly worry that they might lose control of the nationalist narrative they unleashed, especially considering how many people produce content on the internet, how fast ideas spread, and how strongly commercial rationales drive misinformation online,” he said.
Last month, a series of widely shared social media articles about people in different countries “yearning to be part of China” resulted in a diplomatic backlash against Beijing. Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry summoned the Chinese ambassador in April to lodge a formal protest against the article.
Following the incident, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the country’s internet regulator which manages the “firewall” and censors material online, announced a two-month long “internet cleansing” to clear privately owned accounts which engage in “smear campaigns”.
The article had at least 100,000 readers, with 753 people donating money to support the account. According to Xigua Data, a firm that monitors traffic on Chinese social media, the account garnered more than 1.7 million page views for 17 articles in April.
According to a statement from WeChat, the account was closed for fabricating facts, stoking xenophobia and misleading the public.
A journalism professor at the University of Hong Kong said this case differed from the Chinese embassy’s tweet, despite both featuring anti-US sentiment.
Masato Kajimoto, who leads research on news literacy and the misinformation ecosystem, said the closure of the WeChat account seemed to be more about Chinese authorities feeling the need to regulate producers of media content whose motivations were often financial rather than political.
“I would think the government doesn’t like some random misinformation going wild and popular, which affects the overall storylines they would like to push, disseminate and control,” he said.
One way for China to respond to the situation was to fact-check social media and to position itself as a protector facts and defender of the integrity of public information, he said.
“In the age of social media, both fake news and fact-checking are being weaponised by people who try to influence or manipulate the narrative in one way or another,” Kajimoto said.
“Not only China but also many other authoritarian states in Asia are now fact-checking social media. Governments in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and other countries all do that.
“Such initiatives benefit them because they can decide what is true and what is not.”
US chip giant GlobalFoundries confirms it has ceased operations at its only Chinese facility, with industry experts saying the poorly-planned project was doomed to fail
Closure deals blow to China’s plans to move up semiconductor value chain, amid increasingly hostile tech rivalry with the United States
Beijing boasted that the final total investment in the GlobalFoundries plant could be US$10 billion. The plant was intended to produce 300mm wafers, a key material in making chips, but production never started at the 65,000 square metre facility, which was completed mid-2018. Photo: Weibo
US chip giant GlobalFoundries has halted operations at a joint venture factory in China, the company has confirmed, dealing a potential blow to China’s bid to own a bigger slice of the global semiconductor market.
The closure of the firm’s only China facility comes just three years after it announced plans to make chips in the mainland, and comes amid an escalating tech war with the United States.
The winding down, however, has little to do with the fierce superpower rivalry. It comes after two years of speculation as to what was actually happening at the US$100 million facility, which was hailed as “a miracle” by local media when announced to fanfare in 2017, but which never got off the ground.
Nonetheless, the symbolism is rich.
China is struggling in its efforts to boost its domestic chip research and production in a bid to counter US efforts to block it from American technology.
Last week, the US Department of Commerce upped the ante by banning the sale
of Huawei-designed chips produced outside America if they are made using the US software and technology, adding further pressure to the Chinese telecom giant’s global supply chain.
The GlobalFoundries factory, in a hi-tech park in the southwestern city of Chengdu, was one of China’s major foreign-invested semiconductor projects, for which the local government rolled out the red carpet three years ago.
At the time, Chengdu boasted that the final total investment in the plant could be US$10 billion. The plant was intended to produce 300mm wafers, a key material in making chips, but production never started at the 65,000 square metre facility, which was completed mid-2018.
A spokesperson for California-based GlobalFoundries confirmed that the Chengdu plant had stopped operations and that it had offered staff an “employee optimisation plan”, a commonly-used euphemism for lay-offs.
“The plan is being carried out on the basis of open and transparent communications with the employees and they have been offered various options to choose from based on their personal situations,” a company statement read.
A 2018 annual report from the joint venture, in which GlobalFoundries had a stake of 51 per cent with the rest controlled by an investment vehicle of the Chengdu government, showed that the plant had 320 employees.
A company notice sent to employees dated May 14 and seen by the Post said that after mid-June, the company would only pay 70 per cent of Chengdu’s minimum monthly wage, about 1,246 yuan (US$175.38), while negotiating severance packages with staff.
For some industry analysts who have followed the Chengdu project from its inception, its demise has less to do with the trade war, more to do with poor planning.
There was little detailed research and planning before the project was launched. As far as the Chengdu government is concerned, it lacks a sufficient understanding of GlobalFoundriesGu Wenjun, analyst
“There was little detailed research and planning before the project was launched. As far as the Chengdu government is concerned, it lacks a sufficient understanding of GlobalFoundries, its decision-making mechanism and economic strengths, and it did not get strong support from the central government,” said Gu Wenjun, chief analyst at Shanghai-based semiconductor research firm ICwise.
The idea of establishing a joint venture was first pitched to Chongqing municipality, a neighbouring city of Chengdu, in 2016. Chongqing signed a memorandum of understanding with GlobalFoundries to set up a plant to manufacture 300mm silicon wafers – components for making integrated circuits – using technology from GlobalFoundries’ Singapore factory.
After the deal to open a Chongqing plant fell through for unclear reasons, Chengdu moved in to cut a deal with GlobalFoundries in late-2016. A 2017 blueprint stated that 3,500 employees could be working at the site, according to Wallace Pai, then GlobalFoundries’ general manager for China.
But production never started. Initially the project was supposed to have two phases: using mainstream technologies to manufacture 300mm wafers from 2018, then transferring to more advanced technologies in late-2019.
However, in October 2018, the two partners decided to “bypass” the phase one manufacturing stage, partly because of China’s increasing demand for more advanced products and GlobalFoundries’ own financial stress. The project has since stalled.
Comparing official announcements from the Chengdu government and GlobalFroundries back in 2017, Gu from ICwise said the two had different focuses, which might explain the plant’s derailment. The government clearly wanted to bring in mainstream, lower-risk technologies to boost the city’s brand, while the company aimed for Chinese capital and government support to invest in more advanced technology, Gu said.
The joint venture will continue after the factory’s demise, with GlobalFoundries still expecting to expand sales in the Chinese market, the company said in its statement. It now has five factories, three in the US and one each in Singapore and Germany.
When The Post contacted the office of the joint venture partner within the Chengdu government, the person answering the phone said they did not know anything about the closure nor future plans, before hanging up without giving their name.
“Our focus in China is on developing and growing our partner ecosystem including creating local technology infrastructure and bringing more intellectual property vendors and electronic design automation partners to better serve the local market,” the company said.
According to the China Semiconductor Industry Association, China’s integrated circuits sales rose 15.8 per cent in 2019 from a year earlier to 756.2 billion yuan (US$106.44 billion), while sales in the global semiconductor market dropped by 12 per cent to US$412 billion.
Last week, Dutch company ASML Holding, a key supplier of chip-making equipment, set up a plant in Wuxi, in Jiangsu province, in a boost to China’s efforts to attract foreign semiconductor investment.
The team, accompanied by a member of Du’s family, was due to travel on Monday, and will handle arrangements for the remains, as well as conducting its own internal investigation, according to Israeli newspaper Haaretz.
Israel’s foreign ministry said its director general Yuval Rotem had spoken with deputy ambassador Dai Yuming to express his condolences. Local police are continuing to investigate at Du’s residence in a suburb of Herzliya, near Tel Aviv.
Details from the Chinese side have been scant. China’s foreign ministry provided a statement to AFP on Sunday which said the preliminary verdict was that Du, 57, had died unexpectedly for health reasons, and details awaited further confirmation. AFP also reported that Du’s wife and son were not with him in Tel Aviv.
“As far as I know, China’s ambassador to Israel Du Wei passed away in ambassador’s residence in Tel Aviv this morning for physical reasons. It happened abruptly,” said Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of state media tabloid Global Times in a tweet late on Sunday night.
Du was last seen in public on Tuesday in a video conference with an official from Israel’s foreign affairs ministry, according to the embassy website.
James Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said Du’s untimely death should be seen as a personal, rather than a political, tragedy for the growing relationship between China and Israel, but he said it came at an important moment for the two countries because of rising US-China tensions.
Dorsey said Israel’s increasing hi-tech cooperation with China, as well as continuing US hostility to Iran – which has close ties with China – were potentially problematic for relations between the two countries.
“I’m not sure that the China-Israel relationship can be seen as independent of the Israel-US relationship. One could argue that the Chinese may be well advised to very quickly replace him soon,” Dorsey said. “Israel could find itself on the fault line of deepening US-China decoupling,” he added.
Israel’s ambassador to China in quarantine after ‘infected’ flight to Seoul
28 Feb 2020
Following a brief trip to Jerusalem on Wednesday – his first foreign visit since March – US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo renewed warnings about China-Israel ties in an interview with Israeli state-owned media outlet Kan News.
“We do not want the Chinese Communist Party to have access to Israeli infrastructure, Israeli communication systems, all of the things that put Israeli citizens at risk,” he said.
China’s embassy in Tel Aviv blasted Pompeo’s comments as “absurd” and “ill-intentioned”. However, the embassy statement was not written by Du, but by a spokesperson.
Du had only served in Israel since February. Just before his arrival, the Chinese embassy had to issue an apology after then-acting ambassador Dai denounced Israel’s tightened restrictions on Chinese visitors by comparing them to the Holocaust.
During his brief tenure, Du gave frequent interviews to local media, speaking mainly about China’s virus control measures, US-China tensions, and friendship between China and the Jewish people.
Du had worked as a career diplomat since entering China’s foreign service in 1989. Before his appointment in Tel Aviv, he served as China’s ambassador to Ukraine from 2016-2019.
Nations may need help from China during virus outbreaks but remain wary of Beijing as adversary in disputed waters
Analysts say code of conduct negotiations are too sensitive and important for virtual meetings and may be delayed until coronavirus crisis is resolved
On April 18, the US Navy Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill (front) and Arleigh-Burke class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry transit the South China Sea. The presence of both Chinese and American navy ships in the area in recent weeks worries Southeast Asian nations. Photo: US Navy
Negotiations between China and its Southeast Asian neighbours for a South China Sea
code of conduct have been postponed as the nations involved put their efforts into containing the Covid-19 pandemic, creating uncertainty about whether the two sides can work together amid rising tensions in the contested territory.
Southeast Asian nations are increasingly caught in a dilemma whether to maintain relations with Beijing during the pandemic while also fearing that tensions over the disputed waters are spiralling out of control. Both Chinese and United States navies are sending vessels to the area more frequently.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi expressed concern over recent activities in the South China Sea, noting that they might potentially escalate tensions at a time when global collective effort to fight Covid-19 was essential.
Speaking on Wednesday, she called on all parties to respect international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
“While negotiation of the code of conduct is being postponed due to Covid-19, Indonesia calls on all relevant parties to exercise self-restraint and to refrain from undertaking action that may erode mutual trust and potentially escalate tension in the region,” she said.
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi. Photo: AP
Calls for a binding code of conduct surfaced in 1995 when China occupied Mischief Reef
, a maritime feature claimed by the Philippines. China did not agree to start talks until 1999, and subsequent negotiations led to a non-binding Declaration on Conduct in 2002.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and China agreed in 2018 on a draft code laying the foundations for conduct in the disputed waters. At that time, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said China hoped to complete the negotiation by the end of 2021, a move he said could show China and Asean could jointly maintain regional peace.
Named and claimed: is Beijing spoiling for a new fight in the South China Sea?
27 Apr 2020
But tensions over the South China Sea have not calmed and, in fact, have surged in recent months with both Beijing and Washington seen to be using the Covid-19 pandemic to create a stronger presence there.
This year, the US has conducted four freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and China has scrambled air and sea patrols to expel US vessels.
The confrontation between Beijing and Southeast Asian nations has also intensified. Last month, a Vietnamese fishing boat sank after a collision with a Chinese coastguard vessel near the Paracel Islands, known in China as the Xisha Islands, and in Vietnam as the Hoang Sa Islands.
On Saturday, the 35th escort fleet of the Chinese navy also conducted drills in the Spratly Islands chain – known as Nansha Islands in China – after completing an operation in the Gulf of Aden, off Somalia. Analysts said the drill aimed to boost far-sea training for combat ships and boost protection against piracy for Chinese merchant ships.
Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said the code of conduct talks had been delayed because of the pandemic, but Beijing was consolidating its position in the South China Sea amid the outbreak.
“So it’s doing what it can now to consolidate and further enhance its position before talks restart, and by then these moves will raise Beijing’s leverage in the negotiations with its Asean counterparts,” he said.
“The current situation gives it a window of opportunity amid this interlude on the talks, to further advance its physical hold in the South China Sea, especially while Asean parties have their hands full on the pandemic”.
Asean nations have turned their attention to coping with coronavirus outbreaks in their own countries. On April 14, a live video conference for the special Asean Plus Three Summit on the coronavirus pandemic was held in Hanoi. Photo: AFP
Kang Lin, a researcher with Hainan University, said progress for the code of conduct would still go ahead, but it might be affected as face-to-face meetings between officials were disrupted.
“The negotiations involves multiple departments, such as diplomacy, maritime affairs, fisheries and even oil and gas-related departments,” he said, adding that those discussions might go online and might not be as effective.
“It is not easy to predict to what extent it will affect next year's goals. If the pandemic cannot be eliminated in the first half of next year, it may be longer than the three-year period we had previously scheduled,” he said.
Richard Heydarian, an academic and former Philippine government adviser, said video-conference meetings would be inadequate for negotiations about the future of the South China Sea.
“The problem with the negotiation of the code is that these are very sensitive, difficult negotiations. I don't think you can really do it just online, these are things that are done in the corridors of power,” he said. “It’s close to impossible to have that right now with the suspension of all international meetings in the Asean.”
Heydarian said Southeast Asian nations hoped to get help from China to contain the pandemic, but were showing unease about Beijing.
“I think there is a lot of resentment building against China,” he said. “There is also a lot of desperation to get assistance from China and, at the same time, complete helplessness with the fact that it is very hard to conduct any important extended international meeting on the level of Asean and beyond under current circumstances.”
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying said on Thursday that China would push forward negotiations on the code of conduct, and hoped the code would be useful for peace and stability over the South China Sea.
The statement, issued on 27 April but only reported this week, singles out stadiums, exhibition centres, museums and theatres as public facilities where it’s especially important to ban plagiarism.
“City constructions are the combination of a city’s external image and internal spirit, revealing a city’s culture,” the government statement says.
It calls for a “new era” of architecture to “strengthen cultural confidence, show the city’s features, exhibit the contemporary spirit, and display the Chinese characteristics”.
Image copyright STR / AFP / GETTYImage caption – Not the Arc de Triomphe, but a college gate in Wuhan
The guidelines on “foreign” architecture were mostly welcomed on Chinese social media.
“The ban is great,” wrote a Weibo user, according to state media the Global Times. “It’s much better to protect our historical architectures than build fake copycat ones.”
Another recalled seeing an imitation White House in Jiangsu province. “It burned my eyes,” she said.
Image copyright OLIVIER CHOUCHANA / GETTYImage caption Thames Town, an English-themed town near Shanghai, pictured in 2008
In 2013, the BBC visited “Thames Town”, an imitation English town in Songjiang in Shanghai.
The town features cobbled streets, a medieval meeting hall – even a statue of Winston Churchill – and was a popular spot for wedding photos.
“Usually if you want to see foreign buildings, you have to go abroad,” said one person. “But if we import them to China, people can save money while experiencing foreign-style architecture.”
Image copyright WANG ZHAO / GETTYImage caption – Raffles City, Chongqing, in 2019 – mimicking the Marina Bay Sands hotel in Singapore
China, of course, is not the only country to borrow – or copy – other countries’ designs.
Las Vegas in the US revels in its imitations of iconic foreign architecture including the Eiffel Tower and Venetian canals.
Thailand also has developments that mimic the Italian countryside and charming English villages, mainly aimed at domestic tourists.
Beijing ‘carefully considering’ unveiling the plane at the Zhuhai Airshow in November at a time of heightened regional tension
H-20 will give China the nuclear triad of submarines, ballistic missiles and bombers
An artist’s impression of what the H-20 may look like. Photo: Weibo
China’s new generation strategic bomber is likely to be ready for delivery this year, but Beijing is said to be weighing the impact of its unveiling at a complex time in regional relations due to the coronavirus pandemic.
Military sources said the Xian H-20 supersonic stealth bomber – expected to double the country’s strike range – could make its first public appearance at this year’s Zhuhai Airshow in November, if the pandemic was sufficiently under control.
“The Zhuhai Airshow is expected to become a platform to promote China’s image and its success in pandemic control – telling the outside world that the contagion did not have any big impacts on Chinese defence industry enterprises,” a source said.
But the appearance of the bomber at this year’s air show could heighten tensions by directly threatening countries within its strike range, especially Australia, Japan and the Korean peninsula.
Thrilling aerobatics fill the skies to open air show in central China
“The Beijing leadership is still carefully considering whether its commission will affect regional balance, especially as regional tensions have been escalating over the Covid-19 pandemic,” another source said.
“Like intercontinental ballistic missiles, all strategic bombers can be used for delivering nuclear weapons … if China claimed it had pursued a national defence policy which is purely defensive in nature, why would it need such an offensive weapon?”
Tensions in the region have worsened in the past month with a war of words between Beijing and Washington over the pandemic, and both sides increasing naval patrols.
The US defence department has estimated a cruising distance of more than 8,500km (5,300 miles) for the H-20, the last in China’s 20 series of new generation warplanes, which includes the J-20 stealth fighter jet, the Y-20 giant transporter and the Z-20 medium-lift utility helicopter.
The arrival of the H-20 would mark the completion of China’s “nuclear triad” of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and air-launched weapons.
An H-6K bomber, or China’s B-52, flies over the South China Sea. Photo: AP
Chinese state television has said the H-20 could alter the strategic calculus between the US and China by doubling the strike range of its current H-6K, dubbed the country’s B-52.
The H-20 has reportedly been designed to strike targets beyond the second island ring – which includes US bases in Japan, Guam, the Philippines and other countries – from bases in mainland China. The third island chain extends to Hawaii and coastal Australia.
It will be equipped with nuclear and conventional missiles with a maximum take-off weight of at least 200 tonnes and a payload of up to 45 tonnes. The bomber is expected to fly at subsonic speeds and could potentially unleash four powerful hypersonic stealth cruise missiles.
However, like China’s first active stealth fighter jet, the J-20, engine development of the H-20 bomber has fallen behind schedule, according to sources.
For the J-20, engineers were developing high-thrust turbofan WS-15 engines, but the jet is understood to be using either Chinese WS-10B or Russian-built AL-31FM2/3 engines, which compromise its manoeuvrability and stealth capabilities at subsonic speeds.
Military enthusiasts have speculated the H-20 might use the NK-321 Russian engine but two independent military sources said it would be equipped with an upgraded WS-10 engine.
“The WS-10 is still a transitional engine for the H-20 because it is not powerful enough. The eligible replacement may take two to three years for development,” one of the sources said.
China must meet air force demand for J-20 stealth jets, say analysts
17 Feb 2020
The second said the speed of the H-20 would be slower than its original design, with some of its original combat capability being reduced.
“That’s why the American air force doesn’t care about the H-20, because it is not strong and powerful enough to cause any challenge to their B-2 and B-21 bombers.”
If the US decided to deploy more F-35 supersonic fighter jets – it has already sold about 200 to Japan and South Korea – it could push China to bring forward the unveiling of the new bomber, the second source said.
“For example, if some US decision makers decided to deploy up to 500 F-35s to Japan, South Korea, and even Singapore, India and Taiwan – making almost all of China’s neighbours in the Indo-Pacific region use F-35s to contain China – that would pushBeijing to launch the H-20 as soon as possible.”
The H-20 is believed to have been in development since the early 2000s. The project to develop a strategic bomber was first announced by the People’s Liberation Army in 2016.
NEW DELHI (Reuters) – Hundreds of foreign companies are actively procuring components for India and Pakistan’s nuclear programmes, taking advantage of gaps in the global regulation of the industry, according to a report by a U.S.-based research group.
Using open-source data, the nonprofit Centre For Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) report provides one of the most comprehensive overviews of networks supplying the rivals, in a region regarded as one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoints.
“India and Pakistan are taking advantage of gaps in global non-proliferation regimes and export controls to get what they need,” said Jack Margolin, a C4ADS analyst and co-author of the report.
It is seldom possible to determine whether individual transactions are illegal by using publicly available data, Margolin said, and the report does not suggest that companies mentioned broke national or international laws or regulations.
But past reports by the think tank, whose financial backers include the Carnegie Corporation and the Wyss Foundation, have often led to action by law enforcement agencies.
Spokesmen from the offices of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan did not respond to requests for comment. Pakistan’s military, which plays a major role in decision-making for the nuclear weapons programme, also declined to comment.
To identify companies involved, C4ADS analysed more than 125 million records of public trade and tender data and documents, and then checked them against already-identified entities listed by export control authorities in the United States and Japan.
Pakistan, which is subject to strict international export controls on its programme, has 113 suspected foreign suppliers listed by the United States and Japan. But the C4ADS report found an additional 46, many in shipment hubs like Hong Kong, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates.
“In Pakistan’s case, they have a lot more stringent controls, and they get around these by using transnational networks… and exploiting opaque jurisdictions,” Margolin said.
The father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, AQ Khan, admitted in 2004 to selling nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya. He was pardoned a day later by Pakistani authorities, which have refused requests from international investigators to question him.
India has a waiver that allows it to buy nuclear technology from international markets. The Indian government allows inspections of some nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but not all of them.
Neither India or Pakistan have signed the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adhered to by most nuclear powers. Consequently, they are not obliged to submit to IAEA oversight over all of their facilities.
C4ADS identified 222 companies that did business with the nuclear facilities in India that had no IAEA oversight. Of these, 86 companies did business with more than one such nuclear facility in India.
“It’s evidence that more needs to be done, and that there needs to be a more sophisticated approach taken to India,” Margolin said. “Just because the product is not explicitly bound for a military facility, that doesn’t mean that the due diligence process ends there.”
India and Pakistan have gone to war three times – twice over the disputed Kashmir region – since they won independence from British colonial rule in 1947.
Having for years secretly developed nuclear weapons capability, the two declared themselves nuclear powers following tit-for-tat atomic tests in 1998.
A few years later, in 2002, the two foes almost went to war for a fourth time, following an attack by Pakistan-based militants on the parliament in New Delhi. And a year ago, a suicide attack by a Pakistan-based militant group in a part of Kashmir controlled by India sparked another flare up in tensions.
Both countries are estimated to have around 150 useable nuclear warheads apiece, according to the Federation of American Scientists, a nonprofit group tracking stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
Carrier targets return of daily services to major Asian cities and more frequent long-haul services
Airline to monitor global situation and adjustments may be made ‘as necessary’
A Cathay Pacific employee stands near the check-in desks at a virtually deserted Hong Kong International Airport. Photo: Sam Tsang
Cathay Pacific Airways has signalled its intent to start reversing its near-total grounding of aircraft because of the coronavirus pandemic, and plans to start increasing its number of passenger flights in the last week of June.
The airline said it hoped to add more long-haul destinations, make flights more frequent, and reinstate some major Asian cities to its daily schedule for the first time in several months, “subject to government travel restrictions”.
Cathay scaled its operations back to a skeleton schedule of 3 per cent of services in early April, and that was extended until June 20. The newly announced increases would take that up to 5 per cent.
Tracking the massive impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the world’s airline industry in early 2020 Singapore Airlines, another of Asia’s major carriers, said last week it would maintain a 96 per cent reduction in flights until the end of June.
Cathay, which has 236 aircraft, currently operates long-haul flights to London Heathrow, Los Angeles, Vancouver and Sydney twice a week, but will increase that to five times a week.
On top of that, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, San Francisco and Melbourne are among the long-haul destinations set to return three times a week.
With regional routes currently operating three times a week, including Tokyo Narita, Taipei, Beijing and Singapore, Asian routes will increase to a daily service. Osaka and Seoul would also return to the network, too.
“We will continue to monitor the developing situation and further adjustments may be made as necessary,” the airline said.
Coronavirus: ban on non-residents leaves Hong Kong airport virtually deserted
Earlier this month, Cathay’s budget unit HK Express extended its total grounding until June 18, having been on hiatus since March 23.
Meanwhile, Boeing has added to warnings of a very slow recovery in air travel, with Dave Calhoun, its CEO, saying demand may not return to 2019 levels for two to three years.
Cathay Pacific’s daily passenger volume has collapsed from regular previous peaks of 100,000 to less than 1,000 in April. Over the past two months, the company has been running more than 250 extra pairs of cargo-only passenger flights to maintain air freight capacity, much of which is accounted for by passenger services.
In a bid to cut costs, most of the Cathay Pacific Group’s 34,200 staff have taken three weeks of unpaid leave. Also, 433 cabin crew in the US and Canada were told they would be laid off, while about 200 pilots in the UK, Australia have been furloughed.
The International Air Transport Association, which revised down pandemic-related revenue losses for the global sector to US$314 billion (HK$2.4 trillion) two weeks ago, said last week the Hong Kong aviation market would take a US$7.5 billion hit this year, a 27 per cent increase on the previous estimate. That equates to a 59 per cent decline in air travel demand, or a loss of almost 31 million passengers, in 2020.
BOCOM International, a financial services company, forecast in a report on Monday that the city’s aviation sector would lose HK$65.2 billion in revenue in 2020, yet Cathay Pacific could emerge as a winner if it survived largely unscathed, given the weakness of rivals at home and in the region plus its dominant position in Hong Kong.
“Hong Kong aviation is at the most critical juncture in its history. Though calamitous, Covid-19 is set to reshape Hong Kong’s aviation industry for the years, possibly decades, to come,” said transportation analyst Luya You.
“Covid-19’s sweeping blows now offer a blank slate for remaining players to regain lost leadership or gain new markets. If [Cathay Pacific] can survive intact from Covid, the carrier could enjoy winner-takes-all growth trajectory in the years following [2020].”
Researchers conclude that the virus was circulating undetected in France in February
Findings highlight the difficulties governments face in tracing the source of coronavirus outbreaks
Researchers in France have carried out genetic analysis and found that the dominant types of the viral strains in the country did not come from China or Italy. Photo: AP
The coronavirus outbreak in France was not caused by cases imported from China, but from a locally circulating strain of unknown origin, according to a new study by French scientists at the Institut Pasteur in Paris.
Genetic analysis showed that the dominant types of the viral strains in France belonged to a clade – or group with a common ancestor – that did not come from China or Italy, the earliest hotspot in Europe.
“The French outbreak has been mainly seeded by one or several variants of this clade … we can infer that the virus was silently circulating in France in February,” said researchers led by Dr Sylvie van der Werf and Etienne Simon-Loriere in a non-peer reviewed paper released on bioRxiv.org last week.
The Covid-19 pandemic has infected more than 128,000 people in France and caused more than 23,000 deaths.
France detected the virus in late January, before any other country in Europe. A few patients with a travel history that included China’s Hubei province were sampled on January 24 and tested positive.
The Covid-19 pandemic has infected more than 128,000 people in France and caused more than 23,000 deaths. Photo: AFP
The French government took quick and decisive measures to trace contacts of the infected people and shut down the chance of further infection.
However, these strains were not found in patients tested after the initial imported cases, suggesting “the quarantine imposed on the initial Covid-19 cases in France appears to have prevented local transmission”, the researchers said.
The Pasteur institute collected samples from more than 90 other patients across France and found the strains all came from one genetic line. Strains following this unique path of evolution had so far only been detected in Europe and the Americas.
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The earliest sample in the French clade was collected on February 19 from a patient who had no history of travel and no known contact with returned travellers.
Several patients had recently travelled to other European countries, the United Arab Emirates, Madagascar and Egypt but there was no direct evidence that they contracted the disease in these destinations.
To the researchers’ surprise, some of the later strains collected were genetically older – or closer to the ancestral root – than the first sample in this clade.
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A possible explanation, according to the authors, was that local transmission had been occurring in France for some time without being detected by health authorities.
The French government may have missed detecting the transmission. According to the researchers, a large proportion of those patients might have had mild symptoms or none at all.
The researchers also found that three sequences later sampled in Algeria were closely related to those in France, suggesting that travellers from France might have introduced the virus to the African country and caused an outbreak.
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Benjamin Neuman, professor and chair of biological sciences with the Texas A&M University-Texarkana, said the French strains might have come from Belgium, where some sequences most closely related to the original strain from China were clustered.
“Since the earliest European strains of [the coronavirus] Sars-CoV-2 seem to be associated with Belgium, the idea that the virus spread from Belgium to both Italy and France at around the same time seems plausible, as this paper contends,” he said.
France is the latest in a growing number of countries and areas where no direct link between China and local outbreaks could be established.
The dominant strains in Russia and Australia, for instance, came from Europe and the United States, respectively, according to some studies.
These findings have drawn fire from some politicians who have tried to deflect domestic anger over their handling of the crisis by blaming China.
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“So now the Fake News @nytimes is tracing the CoronaVirus origins back to Europe, NOT China. This is a first!” he tweeted on April 11, referring to a story about the studies in the The New York Times’ science section.
The findings also highlight the difficulties governments face in tracing the source of coronavirus outbreaks.
Less-developed countries may never know where their strains came from due to inadequate testing and sequencing capability.
India, for example, has released the genetic sequence of fewer than 40 samples to the public so far, a small number considering its huge population.
Most of the strains sampled in 35 early cases came from clades that could be traced to Italy and Iran, with only a few from China, according to a recent study. But researchers were not able to track further because of the lack of data.
A scientist on the study, Dr Mukesh Thakur, of the Zoological Survey of India, said it was too early to rule out China as the source of outbreaks in India because the number of samples at hand was limited.
A 20-year-old student studying medicine in Wuhan, for instance, might have come in contact with many people on the way home before she was tested positive on January 30.
Thakur said local media reported that the Indian government quarantined 3,500 people possibly linked to three positive cases imported from Wuhan.
“God knows how many of them tested positive in the subsequent stages,” Thakur said in an email response to the Post’s queries on Tuesday.
Some prominent scientists, including Francis Collins, director of the US National Institutes of Health, said the virus might have been spreading quietly in humans for years, or even decades, without causing a detectable outbreak.
The virus had thus adapted well to the human body. Some genes regulating its binding to host cells were similar, or even identical, to those found in some other highly infectious human viruses, such as HIV and Ebola.
According to some estimates, the ancestor of Sars-CoV-2, the virus causing Covid-19, might have left bats between 50 and 70 years ago. A recent study by a team of geneticists in Oxford University estimated the first outbreak of the current pandemic could have occurred as early as September last year.
They found that the dominant strains circulating in China and Asia were genetically younger than some popular strains in the United States.
But trade with partner countries might not be as badly affected as with countries elsewhere in the world, observers say
China’s trade with belt and road countries rose by 3.2 per cent in the January-March period, but second-quarter results will depend on how well they manage to contain the pathogen, academic says
China’s investment in foreign infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative has been curtailed because of the coronavirus pandemic. Photo: Xinhua
The coronavirus pandemic is set to cause a slump in Chinese investment in its signature
and a dip in trade with partner countries that could take a year to overcome, analysts say.
But the impact of the health crisis on China’s economic relations with nations involved in the ambitious infrastructure development programme might not be as great as on those that are not.
China’s total foreign trade in the first quarter of 2020 fell by 6.4 per cent year on year, according to official figures from Beijing.
Trade with the United States, Europe and Japan all dropped in the period, by 18.3, 10.4 and 8.1 per cent, respectively, the commerce ministry said.
By comparison, China’s trade with belt and road countries increased by 3.2 per cent in the first quarter, although the growth figure was lower than the 10.8 per cent reported for the whole of 2019.
China’s trade with 56 belt and road countries – located across Africa, Asia, Europe and South America – accounts for about 30 per cent of its total annual volume, according to the commerce ministry.
Despite the first-quarter growth, Tong Jiadong, a professor of international trade at Nankai University in Tianjin, said he expected China’s trade with belt and road countries to fall by between 2 and 5 per cent this year.
His predictions are less gloomy than the 13 to 32 per cent contraction in global trade forecast for this year by the World Trade Organisation.
“A drop in [China’s total] first-quarter trade was inevitable but it slowly started to recover as it resumed production, especially with Southeast Asian, Eastern European and Arab countries,” Tong said.
“The second quarter will really depend on how the epidemic is contained in belt and road countries.”
Nick Marro, Hong Kong-based head of global trade at the Economist Intelligence Unit, said he expected China’s total overseas direct investment to fall by about 30 per cent this year, which would be bad news for the belt and road plan.
“This will derive from a combination of growing domestic stress in China, enhanced regulatory scrutiny over Chinese investment in major international markets, and weakened global economic prospects that will naturally depress investment demand,” he said.
The development of the Chinese built and operated special economic zone in the Cambodian town of Sihanoukville is reported to have slowed, while infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, including the Payra coal-fired power plant, have been put on hold.
The development of the Chinese built and operated special economic zone in the Cambodian town of Sihanoukville is reported to have slowed. Photo: AFP
Marro said the reduction of capital and labour from China might complicate other projects for key belt and road partner, like Pakistan, which is home to infrastructure projects worth tens of billions of US dollars, and funded and built in large part by China.
“Pakistan looks concerning, particularly in terms of how we’ve assessed its sovereign and currency risk,” Marro said.
“Public debt is high compared to other emerging markets, while the coronavirus will push the budget deficit to expand to 10 per cent of GDP [gross domestic product] this year.”
Last week, Pakistan asked China for a 10-year extension to the repayment period on US$30 billion worth of loans used to fund the development of infrastructure projects, according to a report by local newspaper Dawn.
China’s overseas investment has been falling steadily from its peak in 2016, mostly as a result of Beijing’s curbs on capital outflows.
Last year, the direct investment by Chinese companies and organisations other than banks in belt and road countries fell 3.8 per cent from 2018 to US$15 billion, with most of the money going to South and Southeast Asian countries, including Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Pakistan.
Tong said the pandemic had made Chinese investors nervous about putting their money in countries where disease control measures were becoming increasingly stringent, but added that the pause in activity would give all parties time to regroup.
“Investment in the second quarter will decline and allow time for the questions to be answered,” he said.
“Past experience along the belt and road has taught many lessons to both China and its partners, and forced them to think calmly about their own interests. The epidemic provides both parties with a good time for this.”
Dr Frans-Paul van der Putten, a senior research fellow at Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands, said China’s post-pandemic strategy for the belt and road in Europe
might include a shift away from investing in high-profile infrastructure projects like ports and airports.
Investors might instead cooperate with transport and logistics providers rather than invest directly, he said.
“Even though in the coming years the amount of money China loans and invests abroad may be lower than in the peak years around 2015-16, I expect it to maintain the belt and road plan as its overall strategic framework for its foreign economic relations,” he said.
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